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INTRODUCTION 
Using its expansive power to regulate interstate commerce, 
Congress has enacted numerous environmental laws since the 1970s.1  
These major statutes include the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean 
Air Act (CAA), and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act (SMCRA), each of which established national standards for 
environmental protection for the first time ever.2  These laws establish 
national requirements for the discharge of pollutants into navigable 
waterways; set standards for the construction of new coal-fired power 
plants; and require coal mining companies to properly clean up 
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 1. The Supreme Court has said that although Congress’ authority to regulate comes from 
the Commerce Clause, environmental statutes “offer States the choice of regulating that activity 
according to federal  standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”  New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
 2. For simplicity, this article will principally reference these three major statutes, although 
the enforcement mechanisms and citizen suit provisions in most federal environmental laws are 
similar. 
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abandoned mine sites.3  They ensure that uniform standards for 
pollution control are in place throughout the country.4 
These statutes were revolutionary not only because they 
recognized a federal role in environmental protection for the first 
time ever, but also because of the enforcement mechanisms they 
established.  First, these laws envision a structure of “cooperative 
federalism” whereby the federal government and the states share in 
the regulatory and enforcement burden.5  Under this cooperative 
approach, states may draft and implement their own programs to 
comply with the laws and consequently must share enforcement 
obligations with the federal government.6 
Second, while Congress intended federal and state agencies to 
hold primary enforcement responsibilities, legislators also included 
provisions allowing private citizens to enforce the laws when the 
government was unwilling or unable to do so.  These so-called 
“citizen suit” provisions, included in every major environmental law, 
allow “citizen attorneys general” to sue violators in federal court.7  
Congress intended citizen suits to supplement government action, to 
make up the balance of necessary enforcement at times when under-
funded or over-worked agencies could not ensure that all laws are 
complied with.8 
 
 3. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) § 102(f), 30 U.S.C. § 
1202(f) (2006); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006); Clean Air Act 
(CAA) § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. Federal regulations establish national standards, but individual states (or Indian tribes) 
may implement their own programs and gain the primary authority and responsibility to enforce 
the law.  For example, to date 46 states have CWA implementation programs that have been 
approved by the federal EPA.  See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, NPDES State Program Status, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). 
 7. All federal environmental statutes, with the exception of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), contain citizen suit provisions.  See, e.g., Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); CWA, 33 
U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 
1415(g)(1) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–8 (2006); Noise Control Act of 
1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2006);  Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (2006); 
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2006); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 8435 (2006); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 
11046(a)(1) (2006); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006). 
 8. Congress intended citizen suits to supplement agency enforcement, to “protect against 
the omnipresent danger of a state shirking its enforcement responsibilities.”  Student Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (D.N.J. 1985). 
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Indeed, today is just such a time.  The cooperative framework, 
which presupposes diligent and uniform state regulation, has broken 
down.  State and federal enforcement budgets are being slashed, 
reducing government oversight and potentially allowing more 
violations of law to go unpunished.9  Moreover, political 
considerations—including interstate competition and pressure from 
industry to minimize regulation—threaten to further compromise the 
states’ ability to enforce the laws.  As government enforcement 
becomes increasingly less reliable, citizen enforcement of 
environmental law is more necessary than ever. 
But as this article explains, citizen enforcement is increasingly 
difficult.  Citizen litigants face mounting legal obstacles that impede 
their access to the courts, potentially depriving them of their 
important role as private attorneys general.  For example, recent 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence threatens to prohibit citizens 
groups from suing state officials for their failure to enforce state 
environmental implementation plans.10  The Supreme Court’s 
standing jurisprudence, moreover, restricts many meritorious claims 
from reaching federal court.11 
The goal of this article is to answer several questions, the 
fundamental question being: in an era when state and federal 
government enforcement of the laws is increasingly unreliable, will 
citizen suits be able to pick up the slack?  That is, will citizen 
enforcement of environmental law be able to adequately complement 
and supplement government enforcement, as Congress intended, so 
that all laws are complied with?  And to this end, what legal and 
legislative changes can be made to ensure that citizen suits can fully 
compensate for any decreases in government action? 
To answer these questions, Part I of this article begins with a 
brief and unprejudiced overview of cooperative federalism, the 
enforcement regime envisioned by Congress whereby the federal 
government, states, and citizens share responsibility to ensure 
compliance with the laws.  This part concludes with a discussion of 
the structure and legislative history of the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit 
 
 9. See Part II for examples of how reductions in agency enforcement funding at the state 
and federal level are already affecting the enforcement of environmental laws. 
 10. See infra Part III.C. 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
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provision as evidence that Congress intended citizen action to form 
the “essential backbone” of environmental protection.12 
In Part II, we examine the disadvantages of cooperative 
federalism, providing a sharp critique of the decentralized regulatory 
model.  A decentralized approach to environmental protection, we 
argue, cannot fully enforce environmental laws.  We discuss the 
inherent flaws in a decentralized enforcement model and also 
reference current challenges that inhibit vigorous state and federal 
enforcement.  For example, budget shortfalls and political resistance 
to regulation in individual states result in disparate enforcement of 
national environmental standards.  The problems we outline in this 
section reinforce our argument that citizen suits are essential to 
ensure compliance with environmental laws. 
Building on the importance of active and vigilant citizen 
attorneys general, Part III explains the obstacles standing in the way 
of these potential public interest litigants.  We attempt to “shine the 
light” on several emerging court-created barriers that currently 
prevent or discourage citizen enforcement of environmental law.  
First, this part illustrates how recent Eleventh Amendment and 
standing jurisprudence has precluded citizen suits and will continue to 
do so unless addressed.  Next this part describes how the judicial 
interpretation of “diligent prosecution” and fee shifting provisions 
discourages and impedes citizen action. 
Finally, Part IV proposes relatively simple legislative changes as 
a way to maximize the public’s ability to enforce environmental laws 
by reducing the court-created barriers and disincentives to citizen 
action.  We suggest a comprehensive legislative solution—the 
enactment of an “Omnibus Environmental Enforcement Act”—as a 
means to facilitate public enforcement of environmental laws.  The 
draft legislation that we propose has several goals.  Among other 
things, it 1) addresses citizen standing by creating a new standing 
paradigm for environmental plaintiffs, one allowing them to act as 
true “citizen attorneys general”; 2) modifies statutory language to 
ensure that only plaintiffs, and not defendants, may recover 
attorneys’ fees following a suit; 3) clarifies the federal nature of state 
regulations pursuant to federal laws, thus ensuring that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not immunize state officials from citizen suits; and 
 
 12. George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in 
Environmental Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10028, 10028 (1999). 
Reisinger_final_cpcxns.doc 2/25/2010  3:06:50 PM 
Winter 2010 ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 5 
4) reaffirms whom Congress intended to be eligible to recover 
litigation costs following a citizen suit. 
As this article seeks to explain, today it is critically important for 
citizens to be able to fully exercise their role as private enforcers of 
environmental law.  Congress has the power, and we believe the 
responsibility, to eliminate the obstacles and disincentives that 
prevent citizen plaintiffs from supplementing government 
enforcement.  The modest legislative changes we propose could 
ensure that citizens have easier access to the courts, as Congress 
originally intended, and that environmental statutes do not go 
unenforced. 
I. ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
As one senator has stated, without effective enforcement, 
environmental protection “lacks meaning, lacks truth, lacks reality.”13  
Indeed, environmental statutes are only effective to the extent that 
they are enforced.  Any standard set by statute or regulation, if not 
enforced, acts merely as a recommendation.  To facilitate the massive 
task of ensuring compliance with environmental laws, Congress 
created a parallel enforcement regime consisting of both agency and 
citizen enforcement.14  Congress hoped that citizen suits would 
supplement government action at times when a lack of resources or 
political considerations would prevent agencies from detecting 
violations or enforcing the law.15  In fact, citizen suit provisions have 
been called “sustenance to a starving agency”16 and the “essential 
backbone” of environmental regulation.17 
Congress intended that environmental laws would be enforced 
through a dual regime consisting of both government and citizen 
enforcement.18  This part will explain these two components and the 
 
 13. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Oversight of the Environmental 
Protection Agency's Enforcement Program: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances, 
Environmental Oversight, Research and Development, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. S. Hrg. 101–503, Nov. 
15, 1989, at 2 (statement of Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman). 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. For a discussion of congressional intent regarding citizen suits, see infra Part I.C. 
 16. Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, The Friendship of the People: Citizen 
Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 283 (2005). 
 17. Van Cleve, supra note 12, at 10028. 
 18. For simplicity, this article classifies the methods of enforcement of environmental laws 
into broad categories: government enforcement and citizen enforcement.  The category of 
government enforcement includes agency actions such as notices of violations, penalties and 
fines, and actual criminal prosecution by state agencies and U.S. attorneys.  Citizen enforcement 
simply means powers exercised under citizen suit provisions. 
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theories supporting each, first by discussing the cooperative federalist 
approach to regulation and enforcement, and later by examining the 
structure and purpose of citizen suit provisions. 
A. Government Enforcement: “Cooperative Federalism” 
The major environmental statutes are, of course, federal laws, 
but the states are primarily responsible for implementing and 
enforcing them.  The goal of the CAA is “to protect and enhance the 
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare.”19  The statute gives states the primary 
responsibility to carry out the act through state implementation plans, 
while the federal government’s role is to preserve the states’ ability to 
do so.20  Federal statutes such as the CAA set minimum requirements, 
and state agencies are allowed to develop implementation plans—
consistent with federal objectives and subject to federal approval—to 
carry out the goals of the statute.21  A federal agency, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will be in charge of 
approving state programs and must monitor the programs for 
continued compliance.22 
This arrangement is called “cooperative federalism.”23  Prior to 
1970, environmental concerns could only be addressed through 
private tort actions or individual state laws, which were often weak or 
non-existent.24  In the 1970s, Congress decided to try the cooperative 
approach to environmental enforcement, not only to add 
enforcement options, but also to remedy the “race to the bottom” in 
state environmental regulation.25  The cooperative approach is also 
 
 19. CAA § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). 
 20. Id. at § 101(a).  In the CWA, moreover, Congress expresses its intent to “recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and 
eliminate pollution.”  CWA § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., CAA § 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006) (the Administrator to approve 
state plans that “provid[e] for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary 
standard in each air quality control region.”). 
 22. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2006). 
 23. Robert Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U 
ENVTL. L. J., 179, 183 (2006). 
 24. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 600 
(1996) (“Until quite recently, the harms that accrued from air and water pollution were 
addressed . . . through the most decentralized of control mechanisms: nuisance law.”). 
 25. A “race to the bottom” refers to competition between states for business, which can 
lead to weakening environmental regulations.  “[M]embers of Congress repeatedly stated their 
belief that the states had failed to adopt effective air pollution programs because they were 
engaged in a ‘race-to-the-bottom.’  States that were eager to attract and keep economic 
development purportedly competed against each other by relaxing environmental regulations 
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intended to streamline the administrative process, spread the burden 
of enforcement, and allow states more autonomy to customize their 
implementation plans—all without compromising the goals of the 
statute.26  States with approved programs are generally authorized to 
issue permits, assess penalties, bring civil actions against violators, 
and negotiate settlements between parties.27 
However, cooperative federalism also means that, after it 
approves a state program, the federal agency with jurisdiction has 
much less of a role in overseeing compliance.  Although the federal 
government retains the authority to prosecute violations—or 
“federalize”28 a program—state agencies are largely responsible for 
enforcement, usually with little oversight from federal agencies.29 
As Part II will discuss, the cooperative federalist approach can be 
described as a “double edged sword.”30  While a decentralized model 
that relies on state enforcement may seem efficient, there are 
significant disadvantages.  For example, when states become 
primarily responsible for carrying out the laws, budget cuts, political 
considerations, and interstate competition affect the zealousness of 
regulation and can lead to disparate enforcement of laws.  And the 
federal government has proven unable to fully make up the difference 
when state enforcement fails. 
 
below some optimal level.” Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: 
The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737 
(2006). 
 26. By allowing states to implement and enforce federal programs, the cooperative 
approach allows states to draw upon the expertise of state agencies and knowledge of local 
conditions.  However, delegated state programs are always subject to federal oversight to ensure 
that they comply with federal standards.  See e.g., CAA § 124(a), § 7424 “Assurance of 
adequacy of State plans.” 
 27. For example, State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) under the Clean Air Act. CAA § 
110. 
 28. We use the term “federalization” to refer to the federal government’s authority to 
withdraw approval of a state program and institute a federal program in its place. 
 29. Three-fourths of environmental regulatory programs have been delegated to state 
agencies, and states undertake a vast majority of the enforcement. David L. Markell, The Role 
of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide 
Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) (“State predominance is the 
norm in the enforcement realm . . . .  States conduct roughly ninety percent of the inspections in 
this country, and, according to leading state officials, they bring approximately eighty to ninety 
percent of all enforcement actions.”). 
 30. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: 
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authorization Is Shared by the United States, the 
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1574 (1995). 
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1.  Cooperative Federalism in Action: Ohio’s SMCRA   
 Regulations 
The state of Ohio’s laws and regulations implementing the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)31 provide a 
timely example of the purposes, advantages, and disadvantages of a 
cooperative approach to environmental regulation and enforcement.32 
With the passage of SMCRA in 1977, Congress set federal 
standards for the regulation of surface coal mining operations as well 
as standards for the reclamation—the cleanup and rehabilitation—of 
abandoned mine lands.33  SMCRA prompted the creation of a new 
federal agency, the Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation 
Enforcement (OSM), within the Department of the Interior.34  OSM 
is charged with enforcing SMCRA and overseeing state approved 
programs.35 
2.  Delegation of Primary Enforcement Obligations 
SMCRA allows coal-producing states to draft and submit their 
own implementation plans for approval by OSM.36  To gain approval 
of its program, a coal-producing state must demonstrate that it “has 
the capability of carrying out the provisions” of SMCRA.37  Among 
other requirements, a state program must provide sanctions for 
violations of surface mining laws; demonstrate sufficient 
administrative and technical personnel and funding to regulate coal 
mining; institute a permit system in conformity with federal law; and 
establish procedures for the designation of certain areas as 
“unsuitable for surface coal mining.”38 
Ohio’s regulatory program was approved by OSM in 1982 and is 
codified in section 1513 of the Ohio Revised Code.  Ohio’s 
implementation plan thus gained “primacy,” and Ohio’s Department 
of Natural Resources was given jurisdiction over the state’s surface 
mining program. Today, Ohio is one of the many coal-producing 
 
 31. Ohio’s implementation SMCRA is found in Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1513. 
 32. In Part II, we will again use Ohio’s SMCRA implementing program to provide 
evidence of the disadvantages of the cooperative approach to regulation and enforcement. 
 33. SMCRA(SMCRA) of 1977 § 102, 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006). 
 34. Id. at § 201(a), § 1211(a). 
 35. Id. at § 201(c), § 1211(c). 
 36. Id. at § 503(a), § 1253(a). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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states with approved programs implementing the requirements of 
SMCRA.39 
3.  The State-Federal Interface 
A key feature of cooperative federalism, however, is the 
continuing oversight exercised by the federal agency with jurisdiction.  
OSM reviews various aspects of Ohio’s program and its regulation of 
mining operations, including the adequacy of the state’s staff.40  If any 
part of a state program fails to meet federal standards, OSM has the 
authority to propose rulemaking or legislative changes to address the 
problem.41  OSM also retains the authority to “federalize”—or 
retake—Ohio’s program at any time if it fails to carry out its statutory 
obligations.42  As we describe in Part II, however, federalization of a 
state program is an option that is rarely used.43 
B. Citizen Suit Provisions: Structure & Purpose 
To complement the federalist approach to government 
enforcement, Congress included citizen suit provisions in almost 
every major environmental law.44  These provisions allow private 
plaintiffs to seek injunctions or recover damages from violators of 
environmental laws.45  Citizen suits were included—after significant 
deliberation and debate among legislators—because Congress knew 
that despite the cooperative federalist regulatory scheme, government 
would never be fully able to enforce the law.  Congress knew that 
effective enforcement of environmental law would require 
 
 39. Of the 26 coal-producing states, only Tennessee and Washington have federally 
administered SMCRA programs.  These states are called “Federal Program States.”  Office of 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, Annual Evaluation Reports of States and 
Tribes, http://www.osmre.gov/Reports/EvalInfo/EvalInfo.shtm (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). 
 40. See Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement, OSM Annual Evaluation 
and Summary Report (2008), http://www.osmre.gov/Reports/EvalInfo/2008/OH08-aml-reg.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2009). 
 41. See SMCRA § 504(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (2006). 
 42. “In the event that a State has a State program for surface coal mining, and is not 
enforcing any part of such program, the Secretary may provide for the Federal enforcement . . . 
of that part of the State program not being enforced by such State.  Id. 
 43. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 44. See supra note 7, for a list of laws with citizen suit provisions. 
 45. Importantly, plaintiffs may not personally recover money damages. “Any benefit from 
the lawsuit, whether injunctive or monetary, inures to the public or to the United States.”  
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 449 (D. Md.1985). 
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government to have, as two scholars have described it, the “friendship 
of the people.”46 
1. Text & Structure 
As the Supreme Court has written, “There is, of course, no more 
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by 
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.”47  It 
is clear from reading the statutes as well as their legislative histories 
that Congress intended citizens to be active enforcers of the law, with 
broad powers to sue.  Congress’ decision to include liberal attorneys’ 
fees provisions,48 for example, and to eliminate procedural barriers 
such as federal amount in controversy requirements,49 provides 
evidence that legislators intended significant public participation. 
a. Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 304 
The CAA of 1970 was the first federal law to include a citizen 
suit provision, and it is a good representation of the general 
structure of analogous provisions in other environmental 
statutes.50  Section 304 of the CAA contains its citizen suit 
provision: 
(a) [A]ny person may commence a civil suit action on his own 
behalf – 
(1) against any person [including a state or government agency] 
who is alleged to have violated. . .or be in violation of (A) an 
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order 
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a 
standard or limitation [or] 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter with is 
not discretionary with the Administrator. 
(b) No action may be commenced (1) under subsection (a)(1) of 
this section (A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice 
of the violation (i) to the [EPA] Administrator, (ii) to the State in 
which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator…[No 
action may be commenced] (B) if the Administrator or State has 
 
 46. Seidenfeld and Nugent quote Niccolo Machiavelli, who once wrote that even powerful 
governments require “the friendship of the people,” in arguing that government needs citizens 
to enforce environmental laws. Seidenfeld and Nugent, supra note 16, at 269. 
 47. United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
 48. See infra Part I.B.d. 
 49. See infra Part I.B.c. 
 50. The citizen suit provisions in all major environmental statutes are almost identical.  See 
supra note 7. 
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commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of 
the United States or a State to require compliance. 51 
b. Notice Requirements: Preserving the Primacy of  Government 
 Enforcement 
Citizen suit provisions such as CAA section 304 require potential 
plaintiffs to provide the violator with 60 days notice before 
commencing a suit.52  CAA section 304(b) also requires plaintiffs to 
provide notice to the federal agency with jurisdiction—in this case, 
EPA—and, in some cases, to a state agency with jurisdiction.53  The 
notice must generally be in writing and provide a description of the 
alleged violation of law.54 
Notice provisions serve several functions.  First, in theory, the 
notice provision will give the violator an opportunity to abate the 
violation and avoid the need for litigation.  More importantly, 
however, the notice requirement ensures that federal and state 
government agencies are aware of each alleged violation and are 
given an opportunity to take enforcement action.55  This procedure 
preserves the government’s role as the primary enforcer of 
environmental laws.  A citizen suit may proceed only when state and 
federal agencies are informed of an alleged violation, and choose not 
to begin an enforcement proceeding.56 
Finally, the notice provisions also allow government to utilize 
public vigilance.  Citizen suit statutes enable agencies to, in effect, 
“farm out” much of the fact-finding and initial legal work to citizen 
activists.  One of the drafters of the CAA’s citizen suit provision said 
he envisioned that citizens would be useful “for detecting violations 
 
 51. CAA § 304(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)–(b) (2006). 
 52. Id. at § 304(b), § 7604(b). 
 53. Id. at § 304(b)(1)(A), §7604(b)(1)(A). 
 54. Id. 
 55. “The notice requirement was intended to ‘further encourage and provide for agency 
enforcement’ that might obviate the need to resort to the courts.” Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Senator Edmund Muskie). 
 56. Note that a citizen suit is barred, moreover, if the government “has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a State to require 
compliance.”  This language prevents government and citizens from simultaneously suing the 
same violator for the same violation of law.  See, e.g., CAA § 304(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 
7604(b)(1)(B) (2006).  The definitions of “diligently prosecuting” and “court,” as you might 
imagine, have been much litigated.  See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1631 (discussing the so-called 
“diligent prosecution bar” to the initiation of citizen suits.). 
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and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies,” who 
presumably would then take over enforcement proceedings.57 
c. Facilitating Citizen Litigation 
While we must recognize that notice provisions indicate that 
Congress wanted agencies to remain the primary enforcers of the law, 
citizen suit provisions contain unique features intended to facilitate 
citizen litigation.  Most obviously, the statutes purport to grant 
universal standing to sue, providing that “any person may commence 
a civil suit” without any further mention of injury requirements.58  
There can be no more persuasive evidence of Congress’ intent to 
facilitate access to the courts than its attempted grant of universal 
standing. 
Further, citizens are expressly authorized to sue either the 
federal government agency with jurisdiction—EPA in the case of the 
CAA—or the appropriate state agency.59  The provisions also grant 
the district court’s jurisdiction “to compel. . .agency action [that is] 
unreasonably delayed.”60  Congress even scuttles amount in 
controversy and diversity requirements, which are traditional 
prerequisites to federal court actions, in order to increase citizen 
participation.61 
Finally, the non-restriction language of CAA section 304(e) acts 
as a final incentive for citizen litigation.62  The statute provides that 
bringing a citizen suit “[shall not] restrict any right which any person 
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to 
seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other 
relief.”63  The non-restriction language makes clear that citizen suit 
plaintiffs will not forfeit their rights to sue for damages in separate 
 
 57. Senate Debate on S. 4358, Sept. 21, 1970, reprinted in Environmental Policy Division of 
the Congressional Reference Service, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, Vol. II at 280. 
 58. See, e.g., CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006).  The Supreme Court has 
challenged this grant of universal standing in a long line of cases, which will be discussed in Part 
III.B., infra. 
 59. Most citizen suit provisions allow an individual to commence a suit against the U.S. or 
against a state agency “to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment.” See id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Train, 510 F.2d at 700 (“[C]itizen suits are intended to] facilitate the citizen's role in 
the enforcement of the Act, both in renouncing those concepts that make federal jurisdiction 
dependent on diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, and in removing the barrier, or 
hindrance, to citizen suits that might be threatened by challenges to plaintiff's standing.”). 
 62. See CAA § 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (2006). 
 63. Id. 
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actions, thus removing a potential disincentive to bring suit.  This is 
an important issue because a plaintiff cannot recover damages in a 
citizen suit enforcement action.64  Therefore, a plaintiff who has 
suffered actual money losses may sue to enforce the statute and also 
may bring a separate common law tort claim for money damages. 
d. Costs & Attorney’s Fees 
The inclusion of novel fee shifting provisions, however, provides 
perhaps the strongest evidence that Congress wanted to facilitate 
vigorous citizen participation.  Each citizen suit provision contains a 
cost clause allowing “prevailing” or “substantially prevailing 
plaintiffs” to recoup litigation expenses.65  Several environmental 
statutes, moreover, provide that a court may award costs and 
attorneys’ fees to any party “whenever the court determines such 
award is appropriate,” suggesting that even unsuccessful plaintiffs 
could recover litigation expenses.66  Costs are normally awarded only 
to prevailing plaintiffs pursuant to fee-shifting provisions, and not to 
prevailing defendants. 67 
In effect, these costs provisions in environmental statutes enable 
successful plaintiffs—and arguably even unsuccessful plaintiffs—to 
recover attorneys’ fees from losing defendants.  Thus, these 
provisions allow plaintiffs with meritorious claims, and the lawyers 
representing them, to bring suit with confidence that they will 
ultimately recover their litigation expenses.  The opportunity for cost 
recovery simultaneously acts as a form of insurance and as an 
incentive for citizens to bring suit. 
i. Breaking from the “American Rule” 
Congress’ inclusion of fee shifting provisions for successful 
plaintiffs was a somewhat revolutionary decision, one that is contrary 
the general rule in American law.  Under the so-called “American 
rule” of the common law, both parties in any lawsuit bear their own 
 
 64. See Chesapeake Bay, 608 F. Supp. at 449. 
 65. See, e.g., CWA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006). 
 66. CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). Compare CWA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1365(d) 
(2006), and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2006) (limiting the award of litigation costs to 
“prevailing or substantially prevailing parties.”). 
 67. To date, only a handful of courts have awarded attorneys’ fees to a prevailing 
defendant pursuant to a fee shifting provision. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, 
1176 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Kerry D. Florio, Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits: 
Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 707, 707–08 (2000). 
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litigation expenses, regardless of the outcome.68  American courts 
have consistently upheld this view for two reasons: 1) because less-
wealthy plaintiffs should not be discouraged from bringing 
meritorious lawsuits out of fear that they will lose and have to pay 
expenses to the winner; and 2) because the calculation of “reasonable 
fees” is too difficult for courts.69  The only exceptions to this rule are 
for “frivolous” claims and citizen suit plaintiffs.70 
ii. The “Appropriate” Standard 
Further, Congress’ use of an “appropriate” standard for fee 
recovery indicates that the legislative intent was to allow even 
unsuccessful plaintiffs to recover fees if deemed appropriate by a 
court.  The statute does not limit fees to winning plaintiffs, but leaves 
open the possibility that unsuccessful or partially successful plaintiffs 
could recover when their legal action nonetheless advances the public 
interest.71  In Ruckleshaus v. Sierra Club, however, the Supreme Court 
rejected this possibility by holding that unsuccessful plaintiffs may not 
recover attorneys’ fees, despite the statute’s language.72  Justice 
Stevens argued, in dissent, that the use of the “appropriate” standard 
was a deliberate act by Congress to give courts the discretion to 
award costs to unsuccessful plaintiffs whose suits advance the public 
interest.73 
The notice provisions74 show that Congress wanted government 
to be the primary enforcer.  Nonetheless, the statutory exception to 
 
 68. See Fleishman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) 
(explaining the “English rule,” which by contrast, provides that the loser pays the litigation 
expenses of the winner, including expert fees, attorney’s fees, and court costs). 
 69. See id. at 718 (“[O]ne should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a 
lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate 
their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel.”). 
 70. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975) 
(explaining that Courts may still award attorneys’ fees to a party when a complaint is frivolous, 
because  the “bad faith exception” allows a successful party to recover attorneys’ fees from an 
opponent who acted “in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”). 
 71. See, e.g., CAA § 304(d). 
 72. 463 U.S. 680, 693 (1983). 
 73. See id. at 694 (Stevens noting that in other federal statutes with attorneys’ fees 
provisions, Congress specifically limited recovery to “prevailing” or “partially prevailing” 
plaintiffs, suggesting that Congress did not intend to limit the class of plaintiffs who could 
recover under citizen suits by stating that “Congress deliberately used language that differs from 
the ‘prevailing party’ standard, and it carefully explained in the legislative history that it 
intended to give the courts of appeals discretionary authority to award fees and costs to a 
broader category of parties.”). 
 74. See, e.g., CAA § 304(b)(1)(A). 
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the American rule created by Congress provides evidence that 
citizens, too, were intended to play an active role in enforcement of 
environmental law. 
2. Legislative History 
Parsing the legislative history behind citizen suit provisions 
reinforces Congress’ apparent goal—evident on the face of the 
statutes themselves—to confer broad enforcement powers to citizens.  
We examine the legislative history behind sections 304 of the CAA75 
and 505 of the CWA76 as well as the courts’ initial response to citizen 
suit provisions as evidence of Congress’ intent. 
a. Environmental Protection: A “Fundamental Concern” to    
 Citizens 
The legislative history behind citizen suit provisions indicates 
that citizens were expected to take action when, for financial or 
political reasons, agencies failed to act.77  Citizens were at once 
intended to serve as watchdogs, inspectors, and prosecutors—and 
citizen suit provisions were intended to encourage this public 
vigilance.  Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME) argued on the Senate 
floor that “citizens can be a useful instrument for detecting violations 
and bringing them to the attention of the enforcement agencies and 
courts alike.”78  Legislators such as Muskie hoped that citizens would 
be able to do much of the necessary information gathering and 
litigation, reducing the financial burden on government agencies.79  
Thus, citizen litigation allows the government to utilize much of the 
technical work performed by non-governmental organizations or 
private citizens. 
The nature of the public rights involved was also considered as a 
justification for the unprecedented power given to citizens.  There is 
evidence that Congress intended the public to have a role in 
environmental protection in part because clean air and clean water 
are of fundamental importance to the lives of all citizens.  During 
debate over the passage of the CAA, Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-
KY) argued that “Perhaps more than in any other Federal program, 
the regulation of environmental quality is of fundamental concern to 
 
 75. See CAA § 304(e). 
 76. See CWA § 505(a). 
 77. See Jeannette L. Austin, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: 
Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 220, 246 (1987). 
 78. Statement of Senator Muskie, supra note 57, at 280. 
 79. See Austin, supra note 77, at 245–46, n. 164. 
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the public.  It is appropriate, therefore, that an opportunity be 
provided for citizen involvement.”80 
b. Judicial Interpretation 
The courts have largely acceded to our interpretation, accepting 
Congress’ intent to promote public action.  In Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Train, for example, the D.C. Circuit stated that 
“[a]nyone even remotely familiar with the case law of the period will 
discern that this provision took broad steps to facilitate the citizen’s 
role in the enforcement of the Act.”81 
The Supreme Court has also largely accepted that Congress 
intended to grant citizens broad enforcement power, although the 
Court’s discussion of citizen suits is often muddled in a debate over 
standing and Congress’ power to grant citizen standing.82  It would be 
fair to say, though, that the Court has always recognized the intent of 
Congress to empower citizen attorneys general; but the justices have 
not always recognized its ability to do so.83 
II. THE FAILURE OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM & DECLINING 
AGENCY ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
In Part II, we expand on our discussion of cooperative 
federalism.  This part outlines the major reasons why a cooperative 
approach is unable to enforce all environmental laws and includes a 
discussion of several emerging challenges which will inhibit agency 
enforcement of these laws in the future.  Most importantly, this part 
argues that the current political and economic climate undermines the 
theories supporting the cooperative federalist enforcement model.  
We argue that the fundamental enforcement challenges inherent in a 
decentralized model will be exacerbated by what appears to be a 
multi-year economic recession.84 
 
 80. 117 CONG. REC. 38,821 (1971) (statement of Sen. John Sherman Cooper). 
 81. See Train, 510 F.2d at 700 (referring to the CWA’s citizen suit provision); see also 
Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263 (noting that with citizen suits, “[c]ongress has opted to rely 
heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy”). 
 82. See discussion infra Part III. 
 83. See generally Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Justice Scalia recognizing 
Congress’s intent to convey broad citizen standing under the Endangered Species Act’s citizen 
suit provision). 
 84. See Barack Obama, Editorial, The Action Americans Need, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2009, 
at A17 (calling the current U.S. economic crisis one that is “as deep and dire as any since the 
days of the Great Depression” and stating that the recovery of the economy, “will be measured 
in years, not months”). 
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The enforcement of environmental law can be described using 
the metaphor of a three-legged stool consisting of state, federal, and 
citizen legs.85  Following this metaphor, we see that the first two legs 
of the stool are increasingly unreliable and unsteady—making a 
strong “citizen leg” all the more necessary to support the weight of 
resource protection. 
A. The Decentralized Enforcement Model 
The primary goal of federal environmental statutes was to 
empower states to enforce national standards.  With the passage of 
the CWA, for example, Congress’ intent was to “recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce, 
and eliminate pollution.”86  Each of the other environmental statutes 
envisions a similar state function.87  The theory was that, by 
outsourcing federal programs to state agencies, national laws could be 
carried out without bankrupting the federal government, while at the 
same time allowing states the autonomy to implement their own 
plans.88  Consequently, the decentralized enforcement model places a 
great deal of power and trust in state governments. 
Unfortunately, there are fundamental flaws with the cooperative 
approach that hamper regulation and enforcement.  At the same time 
that states have taken on more responsibility, their own regulatory 
agencies have been simultaneously hindered by political resistance to 
increased regulation and fewer dollars for enforcement.  
Furthermore, in cases where state regulation has failed, the federal 
backup enforcement has been lacking.  When combined, these 
complicating factors create the potential for a “perfect storm” that 
threatens the effectiveness of every major environmental program. 
1. Increasing State Oversight 
Today, states oversee almost every delegable environmental 
program, and state agencies account for the vast majority of 
 
 85. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1617 (describing this cooperative model as a “triangular 
federal system,” consisting of state, federal, and citizen enforcement). 
 86. CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006). 
 87. See, e.g., CAA § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006) (describing requirements for “state 
implementation plans for national . . . ambient air quality standards”). 
 88. See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When There is an “Emerging 
Consensus” of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 649, 655 (2008). 
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inspections and enforcement actions.89  Over the last two decades, 
states have taken on an increasingly large role in enforcement.  In 
1994, only forty percent of delegable environmental programs had 
been delegated to state agencies.90  In 2000, states were in charge of 
implementing seventy percent of delegable programs.91  By 2007, the 
percentage had risen to over ninety.92 
As states have gradually taken on more responsibility for 
environmental programs, there has been a corresponding decrease in 
federal funding for state agency programs.  In 1986, federal EPA 
funds accounted for fifty-eight percent of state budgets for the 
enforcement of federal laws.93  By 2008, federal appropriations had 
been reduced to twenty-three percent of state environmental 
budgets.94 
On one hand, the decrease in federal funding makes sense in a 
decentralized system.  One purpose of a federalist approach is, in fact, 
to reduce the financial burden on the federal government by 
delegating programs.  At the same time, however, the loss of federal 
funding removes one of the incentives, or “carrots,” used to 
encourage state enforcement of national standards.95  And when the 
federal government reduces spending on oversight and enforcement, 
states must increase their own spending to make up the balance of 
enforcement funding. 
  B. Disadvantages to State Administration—The “Unlevel Playing 
Field” 
States now have the authority to implement federal programs as 
well as the financial responsibility to fund them.  The gradual 
delegation of environmental programs over the last two decades has 
increased the importance of states and made environmental 
 
 89. See R. Steven Brown, Environmental Council of the States (ECOS), State 
Environmental Expenditures 2005 – 2008, 1 (2008), http://www.ecos.org/files/3057_file_March_ 
2008_Green_Report.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 3 (quantifying delegable environmental programs such as the CWA, CAA, and 
SMCRA programs, as well as programs implementing numerous other environmental laws). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. See CWA § 106(e), 33 U.S.C. 1256(e) (2006) (explaining how EPA can condition grants 
to help implement federal programs on states’ compliance with CWA’s water quality 
monitoring procedures.); see also Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural 
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 191 (2005). 
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enforcement vulnerable to the several inherent flaws of a 
decentralized model.  At least one scholar has described the 
fundamental disadvantage of cooperative federalism as the problem 
of “the unlevel playing field.”96  That is, the cooperative model makes 
the enforcement of federal laws dependant on individual states, each 
with its own unique financial and political circumstances. 
1. Political Considerations & “Competitive Business Advantage” 
The major challenge for states is that they must balance the 
environmental benefits of vigorous enforcement of environmental 
programs with the economic consequences of stringent regulation.  
Not surprisingly, each state wants to foster a competitive business 
advantage to attract and keep jobs within its borders.  No governor or 
state administrator wants to implement policies that could dissuade 
industry from expanding or relocating in his or her state, and no state 
wants to risk losing jobs because a company perceives that a 
neighboring state’s regulations are more business-friendly.97  For 
these reasons, many states feel pressure to deregulate and reduce 
enforcement actions in an effort to attract and keep jobs in-state.  
These pressures create what has been called a “perverse incentive” 
for state administrators to weaken regulations and ignore violations.98 
a. Ohio’s Regulatory Reform Task Force 
The competitive advantage challenge has manifested itself in an 
increased “regulatory reform” effort in Ohio, an effort which is 
designed to promote business growth in the state.  In 2008, a 
bipartisan group of state lawmakers created a Regulatory Reform 
Task Force with the express purpose of reducing the “red tape and 
bureaucracy. . .to ensure [that Ohio is] competitive with other states 
and countries that are competing for the same jobs and economic 
investment.”99 
The task force traveled the state listening to testimony from 
business owners, many of whom complained about excessive 
 
 96. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1574. 
 97. See id. at 1575 (“States with strong environmental programs feel intense local political 
pressure to slacken enforcement, while states with weak programs are loath to abandon the 
economic advantage that lax environmental enforcement provides.”). 
 98. Glicksman, supra note 25. 
 99. Ohio General Assembly Task Force, Ohio Regulatory Reform Task Force Rep. 1 
(2008). 
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regulation from Ohio EPA.100  A major theme of the public fora was 
the threat that environmental regulations pose to job creation.101  The 
final recommendations of Ohio’s task force, and subsequent 
legislation introduced by its chairman, aim to “streamline” agency 
administration of the laws, including many of the procedures designed 
to ensure effective environmental regulation.102  The proposed 
legislation requires, among other things, that agencies provide an 
analysis of how the adverse impacts of a regulation on small 
businesses can be lessened through methods such as alternative 
compliance methods, small-business-specific performance standards, 
and even exemptions from environmental regulation for small 
businesses.103  This type of legislation sets the stage for a renewed 
“race to the bottom.”104 
b. The Governor’s “Common Sense Business Regulations” 
In February of 2008, Governor Ted Strickland of Ohio signed 
Executive Order 2008-04S, entitled “Implementing Common Sense 
Business Regulations.”105  In many ways, the Order mirrors the goals 
of Ohio Regulatory Reform Task Force.  For example, the Order 
mandates that “[a]gencies should consider whether proposed rules, 
and the cumulative effect of proposed rules, make Ohio a more or 
less attractive place to do business.”106 
Regulatory reform efforts such as those in Ohio illustrate the 
political challenges that can stand in the way of increased, or even 
status quo, state regulation.  In a state such as Ohio, which is losing 
 
 100. Id. (illustrating how one business owner testified that his wind turbine company 
ultimately decided not to locate its business in Ohio because the state’s environmental 
permitting process was “so cumbersome, costly and time-consuming” and “[could] not match 
the 30-45 day permitting process of Alabama and South Dakota”). 
 101. See id. at 1–2 (testimony of Dan Lake and Mark Wilson regarding Ohio EPA’s 
permitting requirements.). 
 102. See id. at 5 (committee making recommendations that all new regulations be subject to 
an “economic impact and/or cost benefit analysis that consider all of the relevant factors to 
business and interested parties in implementing and complying with the rules”).  Legislation 
recently introduced in the Ohio legislature contains similar cost-benefit requirements for all 
agency rule-making. Id. 
 103. 128th Ohio General Assembly, Am. S. B. No. 3, 128th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 
2009). 
 104. See Glicksman, supra note 25 (quoting John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism 
Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1183, 1221–22 (1995)). 
 105. Executive Order 2008-04S (2008), http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/0/ 
Executive%20Orders/Executive%20Order%202008-04S.pdf. 
 106. See id. at 3 (Gov. Strickland, a Democrat, illustrating that regulatory reform efforts are 
not limited to “small-government” conservatives). 
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jobs at an especially high rate,107 policies aimed at business growth 
may trump environmental protection.108  State executives and agencies 
will continue to hesitate to increase oversight and enforcement 
proceedings out of fear that these actions could sacrifice the state’s 
competitive business advantage.  There is a default political resistance 
to increased environmental protection in states such as Ohio.  
Lawmakers and officials from both political parties face the same 
pressures to deregulate and reform. 
Importantly, while state officials are proposing ways to reduce 
the regulatory burden on business, there is no corresponding effort to 
increase environmental oversight.  In this way, the political deck is 
stacked against increased environmental enforcement.  An economic 
recession, such as today’s, will only add to the institutional opposition 
to regulation, making environmental enforcement by state agencies 
all the more difficult. 
2. State Budget Cuts 
The cooperative model also makes the enforcement of national 
environmental objectives subject to budget cuts and shortfalls in each 
individual state, which further threatens the effectiveness of 
cooperative federalism.  Unlike the federal government, most states 
are bound by balanced budget laws and are unable to run deficits 
during economic recessions.109  Therefore, states must balance their 
budgets each year and are more susceptible to economic cycles. 
In fiscal year 2009, twenty-nine states are expected to face budget 
gaps of a combined $48 billion.110  In an economic recession, states 
lose revenue from sales taxes and property taxes,111 which forces state 
governors to make difficult choices: either cut spending, raise taxes, 
 
 107. See generally Charles W. McMillion, OHIO’S JOB LOSSES: 2000 TO 2007 WORST LOSSES 
SINCE THE DEPRESSION, MBG Information Services 3 (2008), available at http:// 
www.amtacdc.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Ohio-jobs-AMTAC%20(2).pdf (showing that 
Ohio’s job losses since 2000 – approximately 213,000 – are exceeded only by Michigan’s). 
 108. See Ohio General Assembly Task Force, supra note 99. 
 109. See William Branigin and Lori Montgomery, Obama’s Budget Proposal Would Push 
Budget Deficit to $1.75T, WASH POST, Feb. 26., 2009 (explaining how the 2009 federal budget, 
recently proposed by the Obama administration, allows an estimated $1.75 trillion deficit). 
Compare OHIO. CONST. art. VIII § 8, XII, § 4 (Ohio’s constitutional requirement of a balanced 
budget), and NY CLS LEGIS LAW. § 54(2)(a) (New York’s constitutional requirement of a 
balanced budget). 
 110. Erica C. McNichol & Iris J. Lav, 29 States Faced Total Budget Shortfalls of at Least $48 
Billion in 2009, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 1 (2008), http://www.cbpp.org/1-15-
08sfp.pdf. 
 111. See id. at 2. 
Reisinger_final_cpcxns.doc 2/25/2010  3:06:50 PM 
22 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:1 
or borrow money to meet annual budgets.  Many states are choosing 
the first option, cutting services, to make up for lost revenue.  As we 
explain below, decreases in enforcement funding at the state level 
compound each of the inherent shortcomings of the decentralized 
model such as the competitive advantage challenge. 
a. California’s Agency Funding Cuts 
California provides the most prominent example of how a state 
budget shortfall can translate into less stringent enforcement of 
national environmental standards.  No state’s budget has been harder 
hit by the recent economic downturn than California’s.112  The state’s 
budget shortfall, estimated at over $40 billion through 2010, is already 
affecting government services.113  At no point in recent history has the 
state reacted to fiscal issues with such deep cuts in services.  In the 
Spring of 2009, the state began a round of multibillion-dollar budget 
cuts, including $30 billion in cuts over two fiscal years to schools, 
colleges, health care, welfare, corrections, recreation, and other 
programs.114 
To meet its 2009 budget, California has proposed cutting the 
enforcement budgets of numerous agencies charged with carrying out 
federal environmental laws.115 For example, California’s Departments 
of Forestry, Fish and Game, Toxic Substances, and California’s air 
and water boards each stand to lose millions.116  The California 
Environmental Protection Agency as a whole will lose $480 million 
from 2008, a cut of twenty percent of its annual budget.117  These 
agencies are charged with implementing almost every delegable 
federal environmental program.118  The state will also layoff 20,000 
state employees, with the layoffs spread across all state agencies.119 
 
 112. See id. at 3. 
 113. Jean Ross, Strangling California’s Budget, L.A. TIMES, January 27, 2009, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-ross27-2009jan27,0,2053416.story. 
 114. California Budget Crisis (2008-09), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009,   http:// 
topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandpossessions/california/budget_cris
is_2008_09/index.html. 
 115. Jordan Rau, Pain of Budget Plan is Widely Spread, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at B7. 
 116. Id. 
 117. FISCAL YEAR 2008-09 BUDGET BRIEFING, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/Budget/2008_2009/Briefing.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2009). 
 118. See generally id. (illustrating how these agencies enforce California’s implementation of 
the CAA, CWA, and Toxic Substances Control Act). 
 119. Nichola Groom, With No Budget, California to Cut 20,000 State Jobs, Feb. 17, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE51G0J420090217. 
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Fewer agency dollars and employees will undoubtedly result in 
fewer inspections and penalties, less rigorous review of permit 
applications, and fewer enforcement proceedings.  Budget cuts to 
state agencies that enforce California’s delegated programs will have 
a direct impact on the enforcement of those federal laws.  “You can 
pass all the environmental protection laws you want,” says one 
California agency official, “but someone has to be there to enforce 
them.”120 
California’s struggles also provide an extreme example of how 
cooperative federalism can allow one problematic state to impede 
national standards.  Because of its size, the state has a massive impact 
on the achievement of the objectives of national laws.  If California, 
the nation’s most populous state121 and one of its largest polluters, is 
unable to meet CAA standards, it would have a great effect on the 
nation’s ability to meet national standards.  Under the decentralized 
model, therefore, the nation’s environmental quality is dependant on 
the unlikely result that each state is able to fully enforce its delegated 
programs. 
C. Inadequate Federal Backup 
Cooperative federalism, in theory, is supposed to provide the 
federal backup, remedying the “unlevel playing field” and disparate 
state regulation, to ensure that enforcement is not compromised by 
political considerations or scarce resources.  Federal oversight is 
intended to recognize and remove the “competitive advantage 
enjoyed by under-regulated entities in under-enforcing states.”122  
However, if the federal government was once able to encourage or 
coerce compliance as a “gorilla in the closet,”123 this is no longer true 
today.  Although the federal government is not bound by the 
balanced budget rules of the states, it is still not exercising sufficient 
oversight.  Federal agencies have not proven that they have the 
capacity or inclination to backup state enforcement, and the warnings 
of “federalization” of state programs are largely empty threats.  
William Cohen, Chief of the General Litigation Section of the Land 
 
 120. Rau, supra note 115, at B7 (“Want to pollute? Want to destroy habitats? Want to 
poach commercially? Have at it . . . we can’t stop you, says the California official.”). 
 121. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR JULY 1, 2008, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). 
 122. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1575. 
 123. DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE 
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 3 (2003). 
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and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice “stated 
that ‘frankly’ there are just too many enforcement cases ‘out there’ 
for the federal and state governments to handle and that citizen suits 
should be applauded as a ‘natural adjunct’ to government 
enforcement.” 124 
1. Ohio’s SMCRA Program 
Ohio’s surface mining program, again, provides a real-life 
example of cooperative federalism’s flaws and highlights the 
inadequacy of backup federal enforcement.  The SMCRA states that 
the OSM must “assure that appropriate procedures are provided 
for . . . [state] enforcement.”125  The statute provides that OSM must 
withdraw approval of a state program if “the State program is not in 
compliance” with the requirements of SMCRA.126  Further, OSM is 
required to “federalize” the state’s surface mining program in the 
event that a state does not enforce its own program or if a state 
program fails to comply with federal standards.127 
In 1982, the Secretary of the Interior approved Ohio’s regulatory 
and abandoned mine lands programs, pursuant to section 405 of 
SMCRA.128  Ohio’s program created a Division of Mineral Resources 
Management, within the state’s Department of Natural Resources, 
which has had the primary enforcement responsibility for carrying out 
SMCRA since 1982.129  Unfortunately, however, Ohio’s surface 
mining regulations have never been in full compliance with SMCRA, 
and thus state agencies have never been fully enforcing the federal 
statute. 
Ohio’s implementation of SMCRA’s reclamation bonding 
requirements is one example of the state’s non-compliance.  SMCRA 
requires all coal mining companies, as a prerequisite to mining, to 
develop plans to “reclaim” mine sites once operations have ceased.130  
Reclamation—or rehabilitation—operations are necessary to prevent 
 
 124. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1560 n.36 (quoting William M. Cohen, Remarks at the ALI-
ABA Environmental Law Course of Study (Feb. 19, 1994)). 
 125. SMCRA § 102(i), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(i) (2006). 
 126. Id. at § 405(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1235(d). 
 127. Id. at § 504(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(3). 
 128. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1513 (West 2009). 
 129. See generally Ohio Department of Natural Resources, A Citizen’s Guide to Mining and 
Reclamation in Ohio 12, available at http://www.ohiodnr.com/Portals/11/publications/ 
pdf/citizens_guide.pdf (showing that the Division of Mineral Resources Management was 
previously referred to as the Division of Mines and Reclamation). 
 130. SMCRA § 507(d), 30 U.S.C § 1257(d). 
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acid mine drainage, erosion, and subsidence and to rehabilitate the 
aesthetic characteristics of Ohio’s hill county.131  Further, as part of 
the reclamation requirements, SMCRA mandates that mining 
operators must post a performance bond covering the land on which 
mining will be conducted.132  This performance bond must be 
“sufficient to assure the completion of the reclamation plan” in the 
case the reclamation had to be completed by the state or federal 
government.133 
2. Non-compliance with SMCRA 
Ohio’s laws do not comply with SMCRA’s bonding requirements 
in several respects.  Ohio’s surface mining regulations, for example, 
make the state’s adjustment of reclamation bond amounts 
discretionary instead of mandatory as required by SMCRA.134  Ohio’s 
regulations also fail to require post-mining discharges to be included 
in the reclamation plan, as required by federal regulations under 
SMCRA.135  Finally, Ohio omits the requirement that performance 
bond releases be conditioned upon “faithful performance” of the 
terms of the bond.136 
Although these inconsistencies may seem minor, the terms of 
Ohio’s bonding laws are critically important.  SMCRA’s reclamation 
bonding program is the heart of the statute’s purpose—to ensure 
proper rehabilitation of mine lands—and Ohio’s lax bonding 
requirements inhibit the objectives of the federal statute. 
3. Federal Inaction 
These and other parts of Ohio’s surface mining program have 
been out of compliance since its inception in 1982, despite SMCRA’s 
statutory requirement that OSM ensure that all state programs 
comply with the law.137  In May 2005, OSM did initiate proceedings, 
pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Part 733, in an attempt to force Ohio to update 
 
 131. Ohio Department of Natural Resources, A Citizen’s Guide to Mining and Reclamation 
in Ohio 12, available at http://www.ohiodnr.com/Portals/11/publications/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf. 
 132. SMCRA § 509(a), 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See generally SMCRA § 509(e), 30 U.S.C. 1259(e); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1513.08(E) 
(showing that bonds should be adjusted whenever affected land area increases or decreases). 
 135. 30 C.F.R. § 780.21(h); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1513.16(F)(8)(a). 
 136. 30 C.F.R. § 800.11; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1531.08(A). 
 137. See OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING ANNUAL SUMMARY OF REGULATORY AND AML 
PROGRAMS, 29 (2009), available at http://www.osmre.gov/Reports/EvalInfo/2009/OH09-aml-
reg.pdf. 
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its bonding program to comply with SMCRA.138  A 733 action 
requires OSM to take corrective action to resolve any inconsistencies 
with federal law, including the federalization of a state program if 
necessary.139  OSM’s 2005 733 action, however, did not mandate 
compliance and did not lead to federalization of the program.140  In 
other words, the 733 process took over 20 years to initiate and has not 
fixed Ohio’s program. 
Ohio’s surface mining program illustrates just one real-life 
example of the inadequacy of cooperative federalism.  Cooperative 
federalism, as a theory of environmental protection, depends on strict 
federal oversight of state programs.  The federal backup enforcement 
that Congress envisioned would ensure compliance has rarely 
materialized in recent years, which has undermined the theories 
behind cooperative federalism.  Although federal agencies retain the 
authority to federalize, or revoke, state programs, they have seldom 
done so.  EPA has the authority to revoke state NPDES programs 
under the CWA, for example, but it has never done so.141  Likewise, 
OSM has only once federalized a state SMCRA implementation 
plan.142  Further, because Congress does not appropriate money in the 
EPA budget for federalizing state programs, EPA would not have 
resources to federalize and enforce a state program, even if it wanted 
to do so.143 
4. Courts Interpret Federal Obligations as Non-mandatory 
One additional challenge inherent in relying on state agency and 
federal backup enforcement of environmental law is the discretionary 
nature of federal obligations.  Several courts have held that federal 
agencies might not be required to initiate enforcement procedures, 
even when provided with evidence of a violation of law. 
 
 138. See id. 
 139. 30 C.F.R. Part 733.12. 
 140. OSM 2009 Annual Report, supra note 137, at 7. 
 141. Whenever a state “is not administering a program approved under [section 402], the 
[EPA] Administrator shall withdraw approval for such program.”  CWA § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. 
1342(c)(3). 
 142. See generally 49 Fed. Reg. 27325 (July 3, 1984) (showing that Tennessee’s SMCRA 
program was federalized by OSM in 1984). 
 143. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of 
Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 527, 594-95 (2005) (“EPA can revoke a state's authority to administer the 
[NPDES program] but Congress has not funded or staffed the federal agency to administer the 
programs when states fail.  As a result, EPA never has revoked a state's authority to administer 
the [NPDES] program when a state has failed to perform its obligations.”). 
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The CWA contains language requiring agencies to investigate 
and remedy violations of its terms.  The statute states that “whenever, 
on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator 
finds that any person is in violation . . . he shall issue an order 
requiring such person to comply.”144  This language clearly appears to 
require agency investigation and enforcement. 
Some courts, however, have held that agency enforcement 
actions are discretionary, even when shown evidence of non-
compliance.  For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight 
Circuit, in Dubois v. Thomas, held that the Director of EPA does not 
have a duty to investigate violations of the CWA when shown 
evidence of a violation.145  The court reached this holding after 
applying a Chevron analysis146 and determining that it would be 
unfeasible for an agency to investigate all alleged violations.147  The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, moreover, has held that the 
Director only has this duty when a finding of a violation is made.148 
D.   The Failure of Cooperative Federalism & The Necessity of Citizen 
Enforcement 
Cooperative federalism inherently allows a “race to the bottom” 
with regard to lax enforcement,149  setting up what has been called a 
“perverse” regulatory scheme.150  States do not have incentives, in the 
form of federal dollars, to enforce the laws, and, at the same time they 
face economic and political pressure to weaken regulations.  
Meanwhile, the federal government is unable or unwilling to exercise 
its backup enforcement power.  Therefore, the cooperative federalist 
 
 144. CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2006). 
 145. Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 948 (1987). 
 146. A “Chevron analysis” refers to the Supreme Court’s doctrine of deference given to 
administrative agencies when interpreting and implementing statutes.  See Chevron v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 147. In Dubois, the court held that the administrator’s decision is “entitled to a high degree 
of judicial deference.” Dubois, 820 F.2d at 948.  In its holding, the court noted that EPA should 
not be required to investigate each allegation because it does not have the resources to do so: 
EPA should not “be compelled to expend its limited resources investigating multitudinous 
complaints irrespective of the magnitude of their environmental significance. As a result, EPA 
would be unable to investigate efficiently and effectively those complaints that EPA, in its 
expertise, considers to be the most egregious violations of the [CWA].”  Id. 
 148. Council of Commuter Orgs. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663, 671–72 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 149. See Glickman, supra note 25, at 737. 
 150. Id. at 719. 
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model relies on states to enforce the laws, with no federal “carrots” or 
“sticks” to encourage or compel them to do so. 
Congress intended that citizen litigation would take up the slack 
in times such as these when economic and political obstacles made 
government enforcement ineffective, and unable to enforce the laws.  
Today provides just such a situation, and citizens must be allowed and 
encouraged to participate in the enforcement of the laws that protect 
their health and natural resources.  Recent history supports—and the 
nation’s deepening economic crisis reinforces—our argument that we 
cannot rely on the cooperative federalist enforcement model to 
ensure compliance with environmental laws. 
III. COURT-CREATED BARRIERS TO CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Part I of this article analyzed the text, structure, and legislative 
history of federal environmental statutes to argue that Congress 
intended citizen litigation to be a meaningful supplement to 
government enforcement of the laws.  Indeed, it showed that 
legislators understood the vulnerabilities of the cooperative federalist 
model and included citizen suit provisions to allow citizens the 
opportunity to ensure that environmental laws were followed.  Part II 
then explained how these vulnerabilities have manifested themselves, 
resulting in a failure of cooperative federalism.  By referencing 
current challenges that inhibit agency enforcement, Part II 
highlighted the need for effective citizen litigation to supplement a 
failed federalist enforcement regime. 
Now, in Part III, we seek to expose the fundamental challenges 
standing in the way of necessary public enforcement of environmental 
law.  This part examines the legal doctrines and court decisions which 
prevent citizen access to the courts.  Specifically, we address the four 
major court-created issues that act as either disincentives or outright 
barriers to citizen litigation.  This part begins with a discussion of 
courts’ interpretation of fee-shifting clauses in environmental statutes.  
Next, we examine the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence and 
recent federal court interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, two 
issues that act as fundamental barriers to citizen enforcement of 
environmental laws pursuant to citizen suit provisions.  Finally, this 
part examines the “diligent prosecution” bar to citizen litigation. 
The first legal issue we address—judicial interpretation of fee-
shifting clauses—currently acts as a deterrent to public participation.  
The final three legal issues we analyze—standing, the Eleventh 
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Amendment bar, and the diligent prosecution preemption—serve as 
direct barriers to citizen litigation.  Each of these issues acts as court-
created barrier that must be resolved to allow meaningful citizen 
participation in environmental enforcement. 
A. Fees & Costs: Which Parties May Recover? 
The first court-created barrier to effective citizen litigation is the 
judicial interpretation of the fee-shifting provisions in environmental 
statutes.151  All citizen suit provisions contain litigation expenses 
clauses, which allow one party to recover its litigation expenses from 
the other “whenever the court determines such award is 
appropriate.”152  However, the interpretation of this phrase—
“whenever . . . appropriate”—has been the subject of much debate, 
the outcome of which affects the role citizens are able to play in 
environmental enforcement. 
As we discussed in Part I, Congress included these costs 
provisions in environmental statutes as a novel device to encourage 
citizen action, and their interpretation can provide either an incentive 
or a disincentive to citizen litigation.153  Fee-shifting clauses allow non-
profit organizations and private citizens to commence legal actions 
with some assurance that they will recover their expenses if they 
prevail.  One commentator has written that without attorneys’ fees 
provisions, citizens would likely be “unable to enforce environmental 
legislation because the costs of litigation are too high.”154  The clauses 
provide a positive incentive to bring meritorious claims, while at the 
same time dissuading frivolous lawsuits, for which no court would 
grant cost recovery to a plaintiff. 
1. The “Appropriate Standard” 
When drafting the attorneys’ fees clauses in citizen suit 
provisions, Congress broke with the legal tradition in this country.  
The general rule in American law is that both parties bear their own 
litigation expenses, regardless of the outcome.155  Most citizen suit 
 
 151. We use the terms “costs,” “litigation expenses” and “attorneys’ fees” interchangeably. 
See infra Part I.C., for additional discussion of the fee-shifting clauses in citizen suit provisions. 
 152. See, e.g., CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. 7604(d) (2006). 
 153. See infra Part I.B.1.d. 
 154. Florio, supra note 67, at 707–08. 
 155. See infra Part I.B.1.d (describing the American rule of the common law under which 
both parties pay their own litigation costs); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185 
(1976) (“Absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not a recoverable cost 
of litigation.”). 
Reisinger_final_cpcxns.doc 2/25/2010  3:06:50 PM 
30 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM Vol. 20:1 
provisions, however, allow plaintiffs (and arguably defendants) to 
recover their litigation costs when deemed “appropriate” by a court.156  
These are some of the few statutory exceptions to the American rule, 
and Congress was aware of both the novelty and the effects of its 
decision to use the appropriate standard for fee-shifting.157 
Congress’ use of the “appropriate standard” in fee-shifting 
clauses was not accidental.  While some environmental statutes limit 
the awards to “prevailing” or “partially prevailing” parties, many do 
not.158  In the former category of clauses, Congress’ intent to limit 
awards to prevailing or partially prevailing plaintiffs is unmistakable.  
By allowing courts even broader discretion to award attorneys’ fees in 
other statutes, Congress intended to encourage public interest 
litigation that would advance the interests of the environmental 
statutes.159  Thus, Congress believed that even unsuccessful plaintiffs 
might, in some circumstances, advance the goals of the statute to the 
extent that a costs award would be appropriate.160 
2. Judicial Interpretation of the “Appropriate Standard” 
a. The Ruckelshaus Majority 
The Supreme Court, however, has narrowly interpreted the text 
of fee-shifting clauses as allowing recovery only by prevailing parties.  
In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court’s conservative wing 
read well beyond the text of the CAA to effectively end the 
possibility that unsuccessful plaintiffs would ever be able to recover 
 
 156. The fee-shifting clauses in about half of the major environmental statutes limit recovery 
to “prevailing or substantially prevailing” parties.  See, e.g., CWA § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) 
(2006); CERCLA § 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002(e), 42 
U.S.C. § 6973 (2006).  The other half, however, provide only that courts have discretion to 
award attorneys’ fees “where appropriate.” See, e.g., CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006); 
SMCRA § 520(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act § 300j–8(d), 42 U.S.C. § 
1449(d) (2006). 
 157. See infra Part I.B.1.d (arguing that Congress’ novel use of fee-shifting provides 
evidence of its intent to facilitate citizen litigation). 
 158. See, e.g., CAA § 304(d) and SMCRA § 520(d) (stating that costs of litigation may be 
awarded “to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”). 
 159. The legislative history of the CAA’s fee-shifting clause shows that its purpose was “to 
encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and administration of the act or 
otherwise serve the public interest. The committee did not intend that the court's discretion to 
award fees under this provision should be restricted to cases in which the party seeking fees was 
the ‘prevailing party.’”  H.R. Rep. No. 95–294, at 337 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N 
1077, 1416. 
 160. The original version of CAA § 304(d), in fact, provided that fee awards would be 
available “whenever the court determines such action is in the public interest.”  116 Cong. Rec. 
32925 (1970). 
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fees.161  The Court determined that “success on the merits must be 
obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award,” despite 
Congress’ use of the phrase “whenever . . . appropriate.”162  The 
majority reached this conclusion by allowing more deference to the 
American rule of the common law than to the clear language of the 
statute. 
The Court’s extra-textual reading of the CAA’s fee-shifting 
clause overturned an award of litigation costs to Sierra Club and the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), which had not prevailed in the 
action but had, according to the court of appeals, nonetheless 
advanced the interests of the statute.163  Sierra Club and EDF filed a 
petition for review of an EPA rule regulating the discharge of sulfur 
dioxide by new power plants.164  In a highly technical argument, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the rule violated the CAA.165  The court of 
appeals, in finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover 
attorneys’ fees, determined that the case “turns not on whether they 
have prevailed in whole or in part, but on whether they have served 
the goals of the Clean Air Act.”166 
b. Stevens’ Dissent 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Ruckelshaus is in part a reaffirmation 
of the D.C. Circuit’s argument that the case presented the type of 
unique situation in which an attorneys’ fee award to an unsuccessful 
plaintiff would be appropriate.167  Stevens also argued that the Court’s 
interpretation was illogical and contrary to Congress’ evident intent 
to allow cost recover for a broader class of plaintiffs.168  Stevens wrote 
that the Court chose to make the specious argument “that a statute 
which does not refer to ‘prevailing parties’ actually does refer to 
‘prevailing parties.’”169 
 
 161. In Ruckelshaus, the Court was interpreting the fee-shifting clause of CAA § 307(f), 42 
U.S.C. § 7606(f), but its reasoning is applicable to § 304(d) and other environmental statues with 
“appropriate” clauses.  Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 682 (1983). 
 162. Id. 
 163. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that, even though Sierra Club was not 
successful on the merits, “this is an ‘appropriate’ case for the court to award attorneys' fees.”  
Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 38. 
 167. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 702. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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3. The Effects of a Narrow Interpretation of “Appropriate” 
The Court’s strict adherence to the American rule will decrease 
the effectiveness of environmental statutes by upsetting the incentives 
to litigate that Congress intended and drafted. It is important for 
courts to interpret “appropriate”170 broadly, as allowing recovery for 
non-prevailing plaintiffs who nonetheless advance the public interest. 
a. Discouraging Necessary Citizen Action 
Most significantly, the Ruckelshaus ruling may have the effect of 
dissuading essential public activism.  Even when an environmental 
group is unsuccessful in its litigation, courts nonetheless rely on its 
scientific research and legal work to reach a decision.  Without the 
work of environmental organizations to analyze the law and science, 
and condense and package that information, courts would often be 
unable to make informed decisions in environmental cases. 
For example, Sierra Club, an organization with massive resources 
and technical staff, spends millions of dollars on research and 
technical analysis to support its litigation each year.171  Courts often 
rely on environmental plaintiffs to provide the analysis necessary for 
a decision.172  Even if an environmental group such as Sierra Club is 
unsuccessful in its litigation, courts may nonetheless rely on its 
scientific research and legal work to reach a decision.  For example, 
due to the complex nature of the CAA case that engendered the 
Ruckelshaus decision, the court was “totally dependent upon Sierra 
Club to brief and advocate” its position.173 
b. Encouraging Evasive Settlements: “Strategic Capitulation” 
The ambiguity surrounding the “appropriate” standard also 
encourages defendants to settle cases with the government 
prematurely so as to preempt attorneys’ fees awards to plaintiffs.  
Defendants who believe they are on the losing end of a citizen suit, 
for example, may attempt to “moot” the case—and avoid paying the 
 
 170. See infra Part I.B.1.ii. 
 171. Sierra Club’s annual budget is approximately $100 million. Traci Watson, Sierra Club 
Could Add Immigration to Green Agenda, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2004, at 3A. 
 172. For example, “Public officials and agencies such as the EPA are prevented from closely 
policing the environmental regulation system due to inadequate funding, staff, or expertise.”  
Further, “the agencies may be under political pressure which prevents it from aggressively 
regulating those agencies it oversees, and the violator may be the government itself.” Nathan A. 
Steimel, Congress Should Define “Prevailing Party” to Ensure Citizen Suits Remain Effective, 11 
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 282, 285 (2004). 
 173. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 41. 
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plaintiff’s costs—by agreeing to some sort of a settlement.  Such a 
settlement may even come in the form of actually providing the 
requested relief.  Catherine Albiston and Laura Nielson refer to this 
type of maneuver by defendants as “strategic capitulation.”174  This 
kind of maneuvering, or gamesmanship, allows defendants to “toy 
with” plaintiffs and drain the litigation funds of public interest 
organizations. 
2. The Specter of Attorneys’ Fees for Defendants 
The uncertain status of the interpretation of fee-shifting clauses 
and the “appropriate” rule also leaves open the possibility for 
defendants’ cost recovery.  The legislative history makes clear that 
Congress intended courts to have the discretion to award fees to a 
broad class of plaintiffs, and some have suggested that defendants 
should also be able to recover. 
Defendants often argue that the “appropriate” standard allows 
them to recover when determined by a court to be appropriate.  The 
prevailing defendants in Citizens for a Better Environment v. Chicago 
Steel, for example, argued that they were entitled to litigation costs 
because their litigation advanced the public interest.175  The steel 
company argued that courts should look to whether a particular 
defendant increased the court’s understanding of the statute in 
question to determine whether defendants may recover.176 
Defendant cost recovery, however, was not intended by the 
drafters and would serve little public purpose.  It is not necessary to 
prevent frivolous environmental litigation because two deterrents 
already serve this function.  First, it is unlikely that any plaintiff 
bringing a frivolous lawsuit will prevail or be granted attorneys’ fees 
by the court.177  Second, the “frivolous” standard, under which a party 
can recover attorneys’ fees when the other brings a frivolous lawsuit, 
acts as an adequate deterrent to prevent frivolous litigation.178  Any 
 
 174. Catherine R. Albiston and Laura B. Nielson, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: 
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 4 (CTR. FOR THE STUDY 
OF LAW & SOC’Y JURISPRUDENCE & SOC. POLICY PROGRAM, Working Paper No. 45, 2006), 
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=csls (defining 
“strategic capitulation” as “situations where defendants faced with likely adverse judgments 
provide the requested relief in order to moot the case and defeat the plaintiff’s fee petition.”). 
 175. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 
83, (1998) (No. 96-643). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Costs provisions allow recovery only in the court’s discretion “whenever the court 
determines such award is appropriate.”  CAA § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006). 
 178. See supra note 70, for a reference to the “frivolous” standard. 
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individual or organization who brings a groundless suit for dilatory or 
other nefarious reasons is subject to the Court’s fee shifting 
standard.179  Defendant cost recovery, if achieved, would create a 
devastating disincentive for public interest environmental litigation.  
Defendant cost recovery would only succeed in placing more fear in 
the minds of prospective plaintiffs, decreasing the likelihood that they 
will choose to litigate. 
3. Congress Can Resolve Ambiguities 
Congress recognized and intended the fee-shifting provisions in 
the CAA and other environmental statutes to act as a statutory 
exception to the American rule.180  But the intention was always to 
provide an incentive for plaintiffs to bring meritorious suits that 
advanced the interests of the statute and the cause of environmental 
protection.  To allow citizen plaintiffs to be successful, the uncertain 
judicial interpretation of these critically important provisions must be 
resolved.  Congress can resolve the ambiguity created by Ruckelshaus 
by clearly defining the phrase “whenever appropriate.”181 
B. Standing 
The express congressional intent of environmental protection 
statutes that contain citizen suit provisions is clearly predicated on the 
“citizen attorney general” principle, as discussed earlier in this article.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion in the landmark 1992 case Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, however, significantly undermined the real world 
operation of this principle by placing strict limits on citizen standing.182  
Soon after the decision, Cass Sunstein ranked the Lujan case as 
“among the most important in history in terms of the sheer number” 
of citizen suits it would invalidate.183 
Since Lujan, the court has redefined its standing requirements, to 
a large degree expanding what might qualify as a sufficient injury.  
But although the Court has expanded the types of “injuries in fact” 
 
 179. See id. 
 180. “Congress meant something more by the provision in the Clean Air Act: it intended to 
encourage the participation of ‘public interest’ groups in resolving complex technical questions 
and important and difficult questions of statutory interpretation, and in monitoring the prompt 
implementation of the Act.”  Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 38. 
 181. See infra Part IV, which provides a legislative solution to clarify the phrase “where . . . 
appropriate.” 
 182. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
 183. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992). 
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that will pass constitutional muster, 184 it has not challenged Lujan’s 
fundamental holding: that Congress cannot confer an individualized 
cause of action for a generalized grievance.185  Therefore, as long as 
Lujan’s fundamental holding is intact, the utility of citizen suits hangs 
in the balance. 
This section begins by examining the standing test established by 
Lujan and the Court’s subsequent liberalization of Lujan’s rigorous 
standing requirements.  Finally, we argue that Congress must act to 
reaffirm its power and intent to confer an individualized cause of 
action to all citizens who wish to enforce environmental laws as 
citizen attorneys general. 
1. Lujan’s High Bar to Citizen Standing 
Lujan involved a citizen suit under the Endangered Species Act186 
in which an environmental group sought to compel the Secretary of 
the Interior to take certain actions to protect endangered species 
abroad.187  The only injury alleged by the environmentalists was that 
the Secretary’s lack of action would cause certain animals, which the 
plaintiffs hoped to view in the future, to become extinct.188 
Lujan established the Court’s familiar three part standing test.  A 
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and 
actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the acts of 
the defendant; and (3) a showing that it is likely that the injury will be 
redressed by a decision favorable to the plaintiff.189  After applying 
this test to the environmental plaintiffs, the Court found that they 
lacked standing.190 
The most important standing requirement is the “injury in fact” 
prong, which in the severity with which it is expressed in Lujan 
directly conflicts with the “citizen attorney general” concept.  This 
concept anticipates that citizens will sue to enforce a statute when 
government has failed to act due to limited resources, a lack of will, 
or a contravening policy perspective—even when plaintiffs have not 
 
 184. As Professor Chemerinsky explains, a generalized grievance occurs when “a citizen or a 
taxpayer [is] concerned with having the government follow the law” not merely for his own 
benefit, but for the benefit of society at large.  ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
91 (5th ed. 2007). 
 185. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77. 
 186. Endangered Species Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006). 
 187. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. 
 188. Id. at 562. 
 189. Id. at 560. 
 190. Id. at 578. 
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suffered a unique definitive injury.  But Lujan requires a plaintiff to 
make a showing of injury that is rigorous.191  After Lujan, citizens 
bringing suit challenging administrative action cannot enforce the 
terms of the underlying legislation in question unless they have 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury. 
a. Scalia’s Separation of Powers Argument 
Because a citizen suit challenge is often a generalized grievance, 
Lujan effectively destroyed the core of the citizen suit provisions in 
congressional actions: the concept that a citizen can be authorized by 
congress to enforce the terms of a regulation for the sake of 
enforcement and to resolve a generalized grievance. 
According to the Lujan court, the inherent conflict between the 
“citizen attorney general” concept and the court’s conception of basic 
constitutional standing demands is a result of clearly visible Article II 
independence.192  The Court rejected a challenge regarding the role of 
the Endangered Species Act in foreign countries based on the injury 
in fact test for standing.193  The Court found that “the affiants’ 
profession of an ‘intent’ to return to the places they had visited before 
– where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the 
opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species was simply 
not enough” to meet the three part test.194  Such “some day’ intentions 
– without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any 
speculation of when some day will be – do not support a finding of the 
‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”195  At its core, 
Lujan relies on the basic separation of powers to justify the extent of 
 
 191. The Court asserts that when the plaintiff is not “an object” of the violation, standing 
will be “substantially more difficult to establish.”  Id. at 561–62.  This requirement precludes 
most citizen suit challenges, which seek to remedy harms to the environment, but not 
necessarily to the individual plaintiff. 
 192. When Congress confers citizen standing, Scalia writes, they “transfer from the 
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed,’ Art. II, § 3.  It would enable the courts, with the 
permission of Congress, ‘to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of 
another and co equal department.’ and to become `virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom 
and soundness of Executive action.’”  Id. at 577 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 
489 (1923)). 
 193. A plaintiff must suffer 1) “an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent’; 2) “there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” and 3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”  
Lujan, 504 U.S. 560–61. 
 194. Id. at 564. 
 195. Id. 
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the “injury in fact” requirement.  For the Lujan majority, Article III 
courts can resolve only those controversies appropriately resolved in 
the judicial process, those controversies which are commensurate 
with the doctrine of standing.196 
b. No Generalized Right for an Individualized Grievance 
Lujan makes an important distinction regarding the character of 
a potential plaintiff, and the burden that that plaintiff must carry to 
establish standing.  According to the Court, if a plaintiff asserts an 
injury due to the regulation of (or failure to regulate) another, more 
is needed than might be needed to establish standing when a plaintiff 
is directly regulated.197  The plaintiffs fail, according to the Court, to 
successfully assert standing for a number of reasons.  First among 
them is the failure to assert an “imminent” injury.  Although the 
plaintiffs clearly demonstrated an interest in the areas potentially 
affected by the federal action, citing previous visits, the Court found 
that without express or concrete plans to return, any injury was too 
speculative.198  The Court defends the “imminence” requirement by 
stating that it is a necessity where no actual harm has been created 
and where harm is merely anticipatory.199  The “imminence” of an 
injury therefore assures at least in part that it can properly be 
resolved by the courts. 
The Court also makes clear that Congress may not create a 
general right of citizen enforcement.200  To construct this central 
argument, the court in Lujan relies on a series of decisions that 
involved dismissal of taxpayer suits directed at state and federal 
expenditures and Congressional actions.201  It is easy to distinguish the 
taxpayer suits from the nature of the Lujan inquiry, however.  Lujan 
involves a congressionally bestowed Article III option for the 
 
 196. Id. at 560. 
 197. “When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the 
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more 
is needed…when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action of inaction he 
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to 
establish.” Id. at 562. 
 198. Id. at 564. 
 199. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565. 
 200. “We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance 
about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application 
of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him 
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”  Id. at 573–
574. 
 201. Id. at 575–576. 
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resolution of generalized grievances, while the cases referenced by 
the Court largely involve challenges to Congressional actions.202  To 
the Court in Lujan, this distinction is irrelevant.  Scalia writes that 
“Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of 
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in 
our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the 
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch—one of 
the essential elements that identifies those ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ 
that are the business of the courts rather than of the political 
branches.”203 
According to the Court, then, the Constitution does not permit 
Congress to restrain the actions of the executive by creating a 
universal citizen interest in executive officers’ compliance with the 
law.204  Therefore, Lujan stands for the basic proposition that 
Congress cannot create an individualized right for a generalized 
grievance and that a concrete individualized injury is always required. 
2. Expanding Lujan: Laidlaw & “Perception-Based” Injuries 
In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, conducted a standing analysis 
which expanded the range of injuries that would give rise to standing 
in a citizen suit context.205  In Laidlaw, an environmental group 
brought suit, pursuant to section 505(a) of the CWA, challenging the 
legality of discharges from a wastewater treatment facility in South 
Carolina.206  The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant’s activities 
created any health risk or environmental harm, only that they feared 
such harm.207  For example, one member was found to have had 
standing because she no longer recreated or picnicked in the area of 
the facility because she feared its harmful environmental effects.208 
The Court allowed “perception-based” injuries to provide citizen 
standing.  For the majority of justices, the lack of demonstrable 
environmental or health related harm did not negate standing: “The 
relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing. . . is not injury 
 
 202. In Lujan, Congress had essentially deputized citizens as agents who could enforce the 
Endangered Species Act.  Litigants in the line of taxpayer suits, however, were not conferred 
standing by Congress. 
 203. Id. at 576. 
 204. Id. at 577. 
 205. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 181–82. 
 208. Id. at 182. 
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to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”209  In effect, it was 
enough that the plaintiffs merely perceived or feared injury. 
Laidlaw represents an important departure from Lujan because 
it made Scalia’s particularized injury test definitively less concrete.  
Laidlaw allows a citizen plaintiff’s mere concern or fear, if 
reasonable, to create a sufficient injury in fact for satisfaction of the 
standing requirement. 
3. Massachusetts v. EPA 
In 2007, Massachusetts v. EPA further reinforced Laidlaw’s core 
concept, thus moving the Court’s standing doctrine farther from the 
rigor of Lujan’s particularized injury requirement.210  The plaintiffs, 
including the state of Massachusetts, sought to compel EPA to 
regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases under the 
CAA.211  EPA first challenged the plaintiffs’ standing to sue, arguing 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the harm alleged—global 
warming and its effects—was too widespread for resolution in an 
Article III court.212  To deal with this thorny question, the court 
looked to Lujan: “To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, 
Lujan holds that a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered a 
concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent, 
that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is likely 
that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”213 
The Court also discusses the unique nature of the named 
plaintiff, the state of Massachusetts.214  The Court contends that the 
state of Massachusetts is unique because of its intent and sovereign 
duty to protect all of its citizens.215  As a member of the Union, the 
state of Massachusetts has given up some of the basic state functions 
that the federal government now enjoys; but it still must work to 
ensure that the federal government follows through on those basic 
 
 209. Id. at 181. 
 210. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 517. 
 213. Id. 
 214. “Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the 
petition for review . . . We stress here, as did Judge Tatel below, the special position and interest 
of Massachusetts.  It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a 
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.”  Id. at 518. 
 215. Id. 
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state functions, including the protection of its citizens from global and 
international external threats.216 
The Court first deals with the causation problem.  In its brief, 
EPA did not try to discredit the causal connection between 
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.217  But EPA did argue 
that global warming is a harm that is too large to be addressed by 
regulation, or by suit.218  Refusing to justify this argument, the Court 
says that EPA overstates its case: “Its argument rests on the 
erroneous assumption that a small incremental step, because it is 
incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet 
accepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory 
action.  Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive 
problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”219  It is easy for the Court to 
accept the fact that even if EPA regulated carbon dioxide emissions 
in the transportation sector, full relief for the injuries of 
Massachusetts would not be created.  The Court states that the relief 
would be small but nonetheless incremental.  Incomplete, incremental 
relief, to the Court, is still relief which can be granted by Article III 
courts.220 
Massachusetts v. EPA presented the Court with an 
unprecedented challenge: climate change.221  Global climate change, 
aside from presenting a redressibility problem, creates another 
inherent standing problem under Lujan.  If an injury must be 
concrete and particular, it would be difficult for any citizen or state to 
claim that climate change affects them in a “particular” or “personal 
and individual way.”222  Although the Court does note that 
Massachusetts had filed affidavits alleging current and prospective 
injury, it does not go into a detailed analysis of the particular nature 
of Massachusetts’ injury.223  The Court nonetheless concludes that 
 
 216. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519. 
 217. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Massachusetts v. Envt’l Protection 
Agency, 594 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120). 
 218. EPA’s argument was that because climate change is a global phenomenon, and the 
litigation centers on the regulation of only one sector (transportation), it is clear then that the 
regulation of that one sector cannot possibly resolve the potential harm faced by Massachusetts.  
See id. 
 219. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 524. 
 220. “A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, 
no matter what happens elsewhere.”  Id. at 526. 
 221. For the first time, the Supreme Court was asked to judge the reliability and sufficiency 
of the evidence that greenhouse cases cause or contribute to climate change. 
 222. Id. at 540. 
 223. Id. at 522. 
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Massachusetts “has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a 
landowner.”224 
4. Roberts’ Dissent & Lujan’s Separation of Powers Analysis 
Justice Roberts’ dissent in Massachusetts challenged the 
majority’s easy dismissal of the analysis around the “particularized 
injury” inquiry.  To Roberts, the very concept of global warming is 
inconsistent with the particularized injury standing requirement.225  
Additionally, the dissent takes issue with the Court’s discussion of 
“imminence,” finding that: “accepting a century-long time horizon 
and a series of compounded estimates renders requirements of 
imminence and immediacy utterly toothless.”226  This, combined with 
disappointed appraisals of the court’s causation and redressability 
analysis, leads to the core of the dissent’s objection with the decision, 
an objection built upon a principle most wholly articulated in Lujan: 
When dealing with legal doctrine phrased in terms of what is ‘fairly’ 
traceable or ‘likely’ to be redressed, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the matter is subject to some debate.  But in considering how 
loosely or rigorously to define those adverbs, it is vital to keep in 
mind the purpose of the inquiry.  The limitation of the judicial 
power to cases and controversies ‘is crucial in maintaining the 
tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution.’227 
This objection is further clarified by Roberts: “the Court’s self-
professed relaxation of those Article III requirements has caused us 
to transgress ‘the proper – and properly limited – role of the courts in 
a democratic society.’”228 
For the dissent, then, the core concern is one of constitutional 
law and the separation of powers.  It is a question of the competency 
of an Article III institution to resolve a question that should be born 
solely by the executive.  This clearly echoes the conclusion in Lujan: 
that Congress cannot create an individualized right for a generalized 
grievance, that a concrete individualized injury is required.  In his 
dissent, Roberts indicates why this important: it is a matter of 
democratic accountability. 
 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 541. 
 226. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 542. 
 227. Id. at 547. 
 228. Id. at 548–549. 
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5. The Precarious Position of Citizen Suits 
Lujan stands for the idea that Congress cannot create an 
individualized right for a generalized grievance, that a concrete 
individualized injury is required.  The line of cases since Lujan has 
clearly eroded the essential injury-in-fact inquiry, which has in turn 
undermined the fundamental conclusion of the case: that a concrete 
individualized injury is required.  Since Lujan, however, the standing 
debate has taken place on Scalia’s terms.  The Court has expanded 
standing opportunities through strained interpretations of the injury 
in fact prong, but it has not reexamined Lujan’s central conclusion: 
that Congress cannot create an individualized right for a generalized 
grievance.  If citizen suits are to be reinvigorated and rehabilitated in 
the still-turbulent wake of Lujan, the individualized injury problem 
must be solved.  Unless the Court changes the frame of the debate—
moving from examinations of the injury in fact parameters to a 
fundamental reevaluation of the constitutional competency 
argument—then citizens will continue to face standing challenges, 
impeding their role as citizen attorneys general. 
Additionally, the Court’s more liberal standing rules established 
after Lujan, which effectively enable citizen plaintiffs to enforce 
environmental laws, are by no means secure.  Massachusetts v. EPA 
was decided in a 5-4 decision by the justices.  Further, two members 
of the Laidlaw majority, O’Conner and Rehnquist, have since retired.  
These two cases softened the effect of Lujan’s standing requirements 
to the benefit of public interest litigation.229  But the Court’s 
conservative bloc—Justices Scalia, Roberts, Alito, and Thomas—now 
appears just one vote shy of overturning the liberal reforms made 
since Lujan.  As we describe in Part IV, Congress is not powerless to 
address the precarious state of citizen standing.  Congress has the 
ability to pass legislation that reaffirms its power and intent to confer 
a cause of action to all citizens. 
C. Eleventh Amendment 
Despite all of the budget cuts facing state agencies, and the 
increasing difficulty of enforcing environmental laws, states—
unsurprisingly—do not like to be compelled to enforce those laws.  
States act as not only regulators and enforcers of federal 
environmental laws, but also play the role of regulated community 
 
 229. Massachusetts v. EPA allowed the state to assert a future injury based only on the 
threat of climate change, while Laidlaw allowed for a “perception-based” standing.  See supra 
note 210. 
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participants when they own, operate, and construct potentially 
polluting facilities like hazardous waste landfills, hospitals, prisons, 
airports, roads, and sewage treatment plants on state property that 
may violate federal laws.  In both capacities, states are often targets of 
citizen suits. 230 
The three major environmental citizen suit provisions that are 
the focus of this article (and for that matter most environmental 
citizen suits) contain language invoking the limits of the Eleventh 
Amendment when suing state officials.231  The application of these 
limits to the CAA, CWA, and SMCRA case law, however, has been 
disparate.  And in the case of SMCRA, the judicial interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment bar has shut many citizens out of the 
enforcement equation.232 
1. Sovereign Immunity and its Exceptions 
In the landmark case of Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court 
held that Article III courts had jurisdiction to hear suits against states; 
states, therefore, were denied complete sovereign immunity from 
suit.233  Chisholm created such an angry reaction from those in 
Georgia and other states that Congress felt it had to act to protect 
states from suit.234  Congress quickly proposed the Eleventh 
Amendment, directed specifically toward overturning the result in 
Chisholm and preventing suits against states by citizens of other 
states.  But the amendment does not altogether prohibit all suits 
against states.235  The text of the Eleventh Amendment is clear, 
 
 230. Hope Babcock, The Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment 
Jurisprudence on Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: Muddied Waters, 83 OR. L. REV. 47, 49 (2004). 
 231. See, e.g., SMCRA §520(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. §1270(a)(2) (2006); CAA § 304(a)(1)(ii),42 
U.S.C. §7604(a)(1)(ii) (2006); CWA § 505(a)(1)(ii), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1)(ii) (2006). 
 232. See Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F.Supp2d 705 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (holding citizen suit 
provisions of CAA were intended as a means of private enforcement against state officials 
within Eleventh Amendment limits, suit did not amount to expansive intrusion on state 
sovereignty interests,and emissions program was a matter of federal law); see also Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75  n.17 (1996) (stating that the CWA is authorized against 
states under the Ex Parte Young doctrine). 
 233. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793). 
 234. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“That decision . . . created such a shock of 
surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course 
adopted by the legislatures of the States.”).  Source generally substantiates the proposition, but 
does not mention Georgia directly. 
 235. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1054–58 (1983). 
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providing that a citizen of one state (or a citizen of another country) 
cannot sue one of the United States in federal court.236  The 
interpretation of the amendment, however, has been decidedly less 
clear. 
For most of the nineteenth century, the Court followed the 
interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall, holding that the Amendment 
was limited to its words.237  However, after Reconstruction, the 
Supreme Court substantially broadened its interpretation of the 
Amendment to provide complete sovereign immunity for states—
including immunity from suits brought by its own citizens.238  The 
Court justified this interpretation by opining that “[t]he fundamental 
rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification”239 and that 
“[m]anifestly, we cannot . . . assume that the letter of the Eleventh 
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against 
nonconsenting States.”240 
Yet, notwithstanding the expansion of immunity for states, the 
Supreme Court has rationalized three exceptions to the states’ 
sovereign immunity: “abrogation,” “waiver,” and the Ex parte Young 
doctrine.  The first two exceptions are of little relevance to the citizen 
suit provisions to enforce state compliance with federal law mandates.  
Therefore, we make short work of those exceptions below, and direct 
our focus to the Ex parte Young doctrine. 
a. Abrogation 
The abrogation of sovereign immunity only exists if Congress 
expresses its unequivocal intention to do so241 and is pursuant to a 
 
 236. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. AMEND. XI. 
 237. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 857–58 (1824). 
 238. Expansion of the doctrine as a formal holding began with Hans, 134 U.S. at 19; see also 
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (“This historic statement justifies the following conclusions: (1) 
It shows that by the Constitution makers it was ordained that the original Constitution should 
not be construed (as it had been in Chisholm v. Georgia) to extend to any suit by a citizen of 
one State, or foreign subjects against a State. (2) If any of these suits were those of citizens 
against his own State (as it may have from the names of the plaintiffs in Huger v. South Carolina 
and Grayson v. Virginia) they, with those against a State by parties not citizens thereof, were 
equally condemned by this amendment.”). 
 239. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). 
 240. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934). 
 241. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (“Congress’ intent to abrogate the States' immunity 
from suit must be obvious from ‘a clear legislative statement.’”) (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)). 
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valid grant of Constitutional authority.242  Congress obtains its power 
to draft laws for the protection of the environment based on the 
Commerce Clause, a very important Constitutional provision.243  
However, courts have, to date, only recognized the enforcement 
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 5) as a 
constitutional basis for Congressional abrogation.244 
 
b. Waiver 
Although a state can also waive its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity and consent to be sued, the parameters put on waiver have 
left it an unavailable avenue around sovereign immunity.  A state 
may waive its immunity by statute or by unequivocally expressing its 
intention to do so.245  But most obviously, states—like people—do not 
like being sued and will rarely, if ever, voluntarily shed their 
immunity.  Some have argued that by agreeing to enforce federal 
standards, a state has waived its sovereign immunity.246  However, 
such a novel argument would suppose the validity of constructive 
waiver of a constitutional right, which has not yet been accepted by 
the courts. 
c. Ex parte Young Doctrine 
The most important exception to state sovereign immunity, and 
the saving grace for environmental citizen suits against state officials, 
is the Ex parte Young doctrine.  The Supreme Court in Ex parte 
Young held that a federal court has jurisdiction over a suit against a 
state officer to enjoin official actions that violate federal law, even if 
the state itself is immune.247  The Ex parte Young exception “create[s] 
an anomaly” where the enforcement of a statute is ‘state action’ 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, yet an ‘individual wrong’ under 
the Eleventh Amendment.248  “In determining whether the doctrine of 
 
 242. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). 
 243. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 244. “We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required 
the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the 
original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States 
pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. 
 245. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238–240 (1985). 
 246. “’Congress required the states to agree to submit to federal jurisdiction . . . to review 
their non-discretionary actions for conformity with federal law’ and therefore that the State 
‘waived its immunity.’” Bragg v. W.Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 298 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 247. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). 
 248. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 48 (4th ed. 1983).  See also 
Idaho v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 288 (1997) (holding that the premise of the 
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Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to a suit, a court 
need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] 
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief 
properly characterized as prospective.’”249  Thus, citizen 
environmental enforcement actions to enjoin a violation of federal 
law by a state fall well within the bounds of Ex parte Young.250 
Professor Hope Babcock addressed and analyzed the four ways 
in which federal courts have narrowed the effectiveness of Ex parte 
Young doctrine to protect the integrity of federal environmental 
citizen enforcement suits: 1) the scope of the doctrine; 2) the scope of 
the relief; 3) the nature and type of the relief; and 4) the character of 
the law under which the suit has been brought.251  Professor Babcock 
goes into great detail on these four, and her analysis sparks alarm for 
the future of citizen suit enforcement against states.  This article 
focuses on the fourth limitation, and the Fourth Circuit’s recent 
opinion in Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association.  This decision 
may effectively turn federal environmental laws into state laws, and 
forever block citizens from forcing states to comply with minimum 
federal standards through citizen suits. 
2. Ex Parte Young and the Bragg Barrier to Citizen Enforcement 
In Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association, citizens of West 
Virginia challenged the issuance of permits for mountaintop removal 
mining,252 alleging that the impacts of the mining practice violated 
SMCRA.253  The citizen complaint alleged that the Director of West 
Virginia’s Division of Environmental Protection violated his non-
discretionary duties under SMCRA by granting the permits.254  The 
Southern District of West Virginia found for the plaintiffs, enjoining 
the state to make certain findings before issuing mining permits.255 
 
doctrine is based on the legal fiction that states cannot authorize its officials to violate federal 
law). 
 249. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). 
 250. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75, n.17. 
 251. Babcock, supra note 230. 
 252. Mountaintop removal mining, in which the tops of mountains and hills are literally 
blown away to reach the coal seams below, is considered to be an especially brutal 
environmental practice. See 30 C.F.R. § 824.11 (“The activities involve the mining of an entire 
coal seam running through the upper fraction of a mountain, ridge, or hill, by removing all of 
the overburden and creating a level plateau or gently rolling contour with no highwalls 
remaining.”). 
 253. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 285. 
 254. Id. at 286. 
 255. Id. 
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that SMCRA, although 
a federal statute, becomes state law once West Virginia’s SMCRA 
program is approved by OSM.256  The court found that, after it is 
approved by the federal government, West Virginia’s SMCRA 
program loses its federal characteristics, which makes the state 
immune from a federal citizen suit under the Eleventh Amendment.257 
To reach this novel result, the Fourth Circuit applied the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman (“Pennhurst II”).258  The Court in Pennhurst II held that 
citizens cannot sue state officials in federal court for violations of 
state law, regardless of the nature of relief sought.259  Likewise, 
because the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity does 
not apply to violations of state law, Bragg held that West Virginia was 
therefore immune from suit.260 
In defining SMCRA minimum standards as state law, the Bragg 
court emphasized the “extraordinary deference given to the states” in 
enforcing SMCRA.261  SMCRA allows states to enact their own laws 
incorporating minimum standards, as well as any more stringent, but 
not inconsistent, standards they might choose.262  The Bragg court 
emphasized that SMCRA granted to states “exclusive jurisdiction 
over the regulation of surface mining” within its borders263 and that if 
a state fails to submit a program for approval, the program is not 
approved, or the Secretary of the Interior withdraws the approval 
because of inadequacy of the program, exclusive jurisdiction resides 
in the federal government.264  The conclusion of the court is that there 
is either federal jurisdiction or state jurisdiction—not both.265 
 
 256. See id. at 295. 
 257. “[E]ven though the States ultimately remain subject to SMCRA, the Act grants 
"exclusive jurisdiction" to a primacy State (one with an approved program), thereby 
conditionally divesting the federal government of direct regulatory authority.” Id. at 294. 
 258. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
 259. Id. at 106 (holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine is “inapplicable in a suit against 
state officials on the basis of state law.”). 
 260. “In this case, the federal interest in adjudicating the dispute is undoubtedly stronger, as 
the rights at issue were created by the State pursuant to a federal invitation to implement a 
program that met certain minimum standards set by Congress. Moreover, the federal 
government, through the Secretary's oversight role, retains an important modicum of control 
over the enforcement of that State law.” Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296. 
 261. Id. at 293. 
 262. Id. at 288. (states may adopt “more stringent, but not inconsistent” standards) (citing 30 
U.S.C. § 1255(b)). 
 263. SMCRA § 503(a), 30 U.S.C. §1253(a) (2006). 
 264. See 30 U.S.C. §1254(a) (2006). 
 265. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 289. 
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3. The Fourth Circuit’s Flawed Reasoning 
The Bragg decision was an unprecedented interpretation of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine.  The Fourth Circuit even acknowledged 
that the state’s primacy is always subject to revocation, and that the 
federal government still oversees a delegated state program and has 
an obligation to inspect and monitor the operations of the state.266  
What the Bragg court missed, however, is that the existence of 
continuing federal oversight of primacy state programs stands for the 
proposition that there is not a clear “drop off” of federal jurisdiction.  
The enforcement of federal minimum standards is an obligation of 
states with approved programs.267  Therefore, citizen attorneys general 
continue to hold authority to enforce those same minimums through 
citizen suits. 
The Fourth Circuit recognized that “rather than asking the States 
to enforce the federal law, Congress through SMCRA invited the 
States to create their own laws, which would be of ‘exclusive’ force in 
the regulation of surface mining within their borders.”268  Yet, what 
the court failed to recognize is that Congress’s “invitation” to the 
states was an invitation to enforce federal minimum standards, not 
merely a request to abide by nonbinding model legislation. In 
instances where a state is not yet meeting the federal regulatory floor, 
enforcement of the minimum standards lies with the federal 
government and citizens.269  What the court failed to comprehend is 
the practical matter that in states like West Virginia and Ohio, and 
any other coal producing state, the so-called state law would not exist 
but for Congress’ “invitation” to enforce SMCRA.270 
The fragile balance between federal and states’ rights is 
maintained through adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
and “it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty 
than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform 
 
 266. Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a)). 
 267. See 30 U.S.C. § 1255(b) (2006). 
 268. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 297 (emphasis added). 
 269. One of Bragg’s progeny in the Third Circuit noted that when an “element of an 
approved state program is inconsistent with – i.e. less stringent than – the federal objective it 
implements,” it is thus federal law and federally enforceable. See Pennsylvania Fed’n of 
Sportsmen’s Club v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 324 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
 270. One reason for the legislation was to make sure that sellers of coal in different states 
will not be used to undermine the ability of the states  to improve and maintain adequate 
standards, and finding that currently there were a substantial number of acres of un-reclaimed 
lands which have posed negative impacts and that lead to socio-economic and environmental 
costs.  See SMCRA § 101(g–h), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g–h) (2006). 
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their conduct to state law.”271  Yet Bragg takes those concepts a step 
too far when it finds that the state’s dignity would be impaired if 
federal citizen enforcement were permitted in the context of a state 
law.272  According to the court, “[t]hat dignity interest does not fade 
into oblivion merely because a State’s law is enacted to comport with 
a federal invitation to regulate within certain parameters and with 
federal agency approval.”273 
However, allowing citizens to use federal courts to enforce 
minimum federal standards does not deprive the state of its ability to 
tailor its regulatory scheme to their unique terrain, climate and 
physical characteristics.274  States can continue to develop and 
implement a program to achieve the purposes of SMCRA as they 
have for over thirty years.  However, whether the state’s regulations 
or enforcement comport to that of the federally mandated minimum 
standards is a question solely of federal law, and thus can be enforced 
by a citizen suit. 
4. Practical Implications of Bragg 
The Bragg decision has the obvious effect of preventing SMCRA 
suits from compelling state officials to enforce the federal statute.  
Bragg’s implications, however, extend more broadly.  The decision 
could prevent all potential citizen litigants from challenging state 
action that violates a federal environmental law. 
a. Preventing SMCRA Citizen Suits 
The first effect of the Bragg court’s Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence will be to keep many SMCRA citizen suits out of 
federal court in a region where enforcement is necessary.  Federal law 
has been ignored and violated by West Virginia for more than a 
decade.275  To the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
West Virginia, “The results are obvious: an immense state liability 
incurred by the mine operators, but borne by the taxpayers, and on-
going pollution of the State’s streams.”276  Bragg’s expansionist view 
 
 271. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). 
 272. Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296. 
 273. Id. at 297; cf. United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 625 (1992) (noting 
that state-law penalties approved by the Environmental Protection Agency and supplanting the 
Clean Water Act did not “arise under federal law” as meant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
 274. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006). 
 275. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W.Va. 
2001). 
 276. Id. 
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of the Eleventh Amendment not only has the effect of keeping citizen 
suits out of court, but also of preventing the enforcement of 
environmental laws. 
The decision in Bragg has been held as controlling also in a Third 
Circuit case, eerily similar to the facts and regulatory predicament 
Ohio faces in dealing with enforcement of the bonding requirements 
of SMCRA.277  In Pennsylvania Federation of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. 
Hess, environmental and conservation groups brought an action 
against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection under SMCRA, alleging a failure to 
perform duties concerning enforcement of its reclamation bonding 
program.278  The Court ruled that because Pennsylvania is a primacy 
state, “OSM has relinquished its regulatory authority and regulation 
has become a matter of state law.”279 
b. Denial of Federal Court Jurisdiction 
The denial of federal court as a venue for citizen suits resulting 
from Bragg has several adverse effects for citizen litigants, each 
decreasing the potential for effective public enforcement of 
environmental laws. 
i. Loss of Fee-shifting Opportunities 
First, without access to the federal courts, citizens could lose the 
opportunity to recover litigation costs.  As explained at length in this 
article, one of the biggest incentives for a citizen litigant to bring an 
enforcement suit is the assurance that he will be able to recover 
attorneys’ fees if successful.280  Such fee shifting is rarely offered by 
state courts, however.  Therefore, denying citizens the right to 
enforce federal environmental standards in federal court, pursuant to 
federal statutes, removes an important incentive to bring suit. 
ii. Less Impartial Decision-making 
Second, unlike federal court where the President appoints judges 
to life terms, many state judges are elected.281  Local politics is thus 
 
 277. See infra Part II.C.1.a. 
 278. 297 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 2002). 
 279. Id. at 324. 
 280. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of fee-shifting clauses in citizen suit provisions.  
One commentator has gone so far as to say that federal citizen suits are “made possible” by the 
inclusion of fee shifting provisions.  Florio, supra note 67, at 707. 
 281. In total, thirty-nine states elect judges at some level, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/american/justice (last visited Dec. 30, 2009). 
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thrust into the center of environmental enforcement.  As states 
continue to try to “level the playing field” for business, the state court 
becomes a less than hospitable place for a citizen plaintiff to assert his 
right to enforce environmental mandates. Finally, many states have 
their own version of sovereign immunity from actions in state court as 
well.282  If the Bragg decision stands, transforming federal law into 
state law for primacy states, the cloak of sovereign immunity could be 
used as a complete bar to citizen suit enforcement of federal 
environmental standards against recalcitrant state agencies. 
c. The Broader Threat to Citizen Enforcement 
The federal sovereign always carries the right to sue its state 
subordinate for a violation of a federal standard;283 therefore, the 
citizen attorney general standing in the shoes of the sovereign also 
possesses an equal right.  However, as more and more states gain 
primacy, the Eleventh Amendment as interpreted by the Fourth 
Circuit could lead to a systematic dismantling of citizen enforcement 
in a time when it is needed most.  Although the Fourth Circuit has 
been the only circuit to address the issue, broadly applying the Fourth 
Circuit’s doctrine would bar citizens from enforcing the federal 
minimums of any environmental statute. 
D. “Diligent Prosecution” 
The legislative history of the CAA, used routinely by courts to 
determine the intent of all citizen enforcement provisions, indicates a 
balance between two very important considerations.  First, the 
legislative history shows that Congress wanted citizen enforcement to 
provide more and better enforcement by “prodding the government” 
to take action against violators and empowering the citizens to take 
action when the government failed to respond.284  Second, this 
authority was qualified to make sure that citizen enforcement “did 
not unduly disrupt or conflict with government enforcement or harass 
violators.”285 
 
 282. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. [BB T.1-OH] § 2744 (2009). 
 283. “Sovereign immunity does not, for example, prevent the U.S. itself from bringing suit 
against an unconsenting state to ensure compliance with federal law.” Bragg, 248 F.3d (citing 
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644–45 (1892)). 
 284. Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent Prosecution” Citizen Suit 
Provision, 10 WID. L. SYMP. 63, 70–71 (2003) (citing Senator Hart’s statement commenting that 
the notice would have the effect of “prodding governmental enforcement. See 116 Cong. Rec. 
33,104 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hart)). 
 285. Id. at 70. 
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Unfortunately, however, courts’ interpretation of these 
provisions has been inconsistent.  This section examines the “diligent 
prosecution” clauses and explains why the absence of a clear 
definition of their terms harms citizen litigants. 
1. Balancing Government & Citizen Enforcement 
The balance between government and citizen enforcement in the 
CAA was struck through the incorporation of the notice, delay, and 
preclusion provisions..286  Under the CAA, “[n]o action may be 
commenced if the Administrator or State has commenced and is 
diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of the United States or a 
State to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but 
in any such action in a court of the United States any person may 
intervene as a matter of right.”287  Thus, if the state has the resources 
and the political will to prosecute a violator that has been brought to 
its attention through a citizen’s 60-day notice, the state should have 
the first bite at the apple. 
As the language implies, and the Courts have interpreted, the 
ability of the state to have the first prosecution right does not bar a 
citizen action once the state merely files suit.  Beyond the statute’s 
grant of intervention to a citizen in the state’s case as a matter of 
right, there are four important caveats to the state’s prosecution 
barring a citizen action: 1) the prosecution must be commenced 
before the citizen files; 2) the state must be diligent in its prosecution; 
3) the state’s action must be in a court; and 4) the state’s action must 
be meant to require compliance.288 
While the diligent prosecution bar’s line of case law is not a 
direct assault on citizen enforcement actions, the case law does bring 
to light the unnecessary ambiguities in the provisions. We next focus 
on two of those ambiguities which courts could use as a barrier to 
citizen enforcement unless there is quick and decisive clarification by 
Congress. 
2. What is “Diligent” & What Constitutes “Compliance”? 
The first and most obvious question is: what constitutes 
“diligent” prosecution of a violation?  The dictionary definition of 
diligent is “careful; attentive; persistent in doing something.”289  This 
 
 286. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006). 
 287. CAA § 304(b)(1)(B), 40 U.S.C. §7604(b)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 288. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2006). 
 289. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (7th ed. 1999). 
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definition provides little help in the context of litigation, as it is 
qualitative and subjective, leaving too much to the whims of the 
court.  One qualification to the diligent prosecution bar is the 
requirement that the state enforcement action must be one calculated 
to “require compliance.”  Courts, in determining the scope of the 
term “diligent” look to whether an action is capable of or calculated 
to lead to compliance.290 
Unfortunately, courts have not reached a consensus on what 
actions are capable of leading to compliance.  Questions still persist as 
to what is meant to require compliance; whether a preclusive action 
by the state is meant to require compliance; and whether the 
government’s prosecution should enjoin the violation or serve as a 
deterrent from future violations.  The last question, of course is the 
most important as it determines what is meant by compliance and 
whether an action leads to compliance. 
3. Who Bears the Burden of Proof? 
To make matters worse, courts have placed citizen plaintiffs with 
the burden of proving that the state’s prosecution is not diligent.  
Courts have held that diligence will be presumed, and, where an 
agency has specifically addressed concerns of analogous citizen suit, 
“deference to an agency’s plan of attack is particularly favored.”291  It 
is unreasonable to expect a citizen plaintiff, whose chief concern is 
protecting the environmental and human health of his community, to 
effectively rebut the presumption that every state action toward a 
defendant was capable of requiring compliance. 
Plaintiffs’ burden to rebut the presumption of diligence 
juxtaposes defendants’ burden to persuade the court that a case is 
precluded by the doctrines of mootness292 and res judicata.293  The 
 
 290. See St. Bernard Citizens for Envtl. Quality, Inc. v. Chalmette Ref., L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 
2d. 592, 606 (E.D. La. 2007), reconsideration denied, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81829 (E.D. La. 
2007) (holding that  “the ‘diligent prosecution’ analysis should look to whether government 
enforcement action is capable of requiring compliance with the Clean Air Act and is in good 
faith calculated to do so.”). 
 291. Am. Canoe Ass’n v City of Attalla, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25057, at *6 (N.D. Ala. 
2003). 
 292. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting 
U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (“A case might become 
moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could 
not reasonably be expected to recur.”)). 
 293. See Worrie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 196–197 (Va. 1956) (“One who asserts the defense 
of res adjudicata has the burden of proving that the very point or question was in issue and 
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doctrines of mootness and res judicata work as the common law 
equivalent of the statutory preclusive device of the diligent 
prosecution bar.  All three doctrines essentially state that if a decision 
on the matter has been made, then allowing the case to continue 
would be purely academic or at the most, wasteful of the court’s 
resources. 
Courts generally do not presume that a given case is res judicata 
or moot.  Thus shifting the burden for essentially the same reasoning 
and outcome is contrary to established doctrines.  Such burden 
shifting also stands as a disincentive to citizens filing suit if most of 
their resources will be spent rebutting deferential presumptions. 
4. Inconsistency of Interpretation Between Acts 
There is also a distinct and unnecessary divergence between the 
CWA and the CAA as to the boundaries of the term “diligent.”  
Under the CWA, the courts have created a higher barrier for the 
citizen suit by stating that “the presumption [of diligence] is not 
rebutted merely by showing that the settlement in the state action was 
less burdensome to the discharger than that demanded in the citizen 
suit.”294 
Under the CAA, however, at least one court expressed 
opposition to the incredible deference to the government in the 
context of citizen enforcement, going as far as saying that “[c]omplete 
deference to agency enforcement strategy, adopted and implemented 
internally and beyond public control, requires a degree of faith in 
bureaucratic energy and effectiveness that would be alien to common 
experience.”295  The court in Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone thus 
chose to examine the specifics of state enforcement that would enable 
citizens to challenge state enforcement that appears to be lax.296  Such 
divergence in interpretation between environmental statutes is 
unproductive.  Congress can resolve these ambiguities by placing the 
burden of proving diligence in the hands of the citizen suit defendant. 
The courts have not technically created a barrier to citizen 
enforcement through their various interpretations of the terms 
“diligent” or “to require compliance,” but the ambiguity left by 
Congress could stand to unnecessarily keep valid citizen suits out of 
 
determined in the former suit.”); see also Commonwealth ex. rel. Gray v. Johnson, 7 Va. App. 
614, 618 (1989). 
 294. Conn. Fund for the Env’t v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F.Supp. 1291 (D. Conn. 1986). 
 295. Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F.Supp. 1159, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 296. See id. 
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court.  Beyond Congressional intervention,297 the courts have the 
ability to ensure that the spirit and intent of citizen suits is 
maintained, and that the important goal of guaranteeing 
environmental compliance is met.  Courts, when faced with a citizen 
suit where the government has not acted to the citizen litigant’s 
satisfaction, should provide citizens the ability to file successive 
actions if the government’s prosecution does not require compliance, 
is too dilatory, or is completely inadequate. 
5. State Preemption of Citizen Suits 
Uncertainty over the definition of diligence and absolute 
deference to the government’s “plan of attack” are most problematic 
for the future effectiveness of citizen suits when the government 
preempts the citizen suit for reasons beyond environmental 
protection.  The notice provisions show that agencies were intended 
to be primary enforcers.  The intervening 60 days prior to the citizen 
filing its suit is meant to provide the government with the “first bite at 
the apple” of enforcing environmental law.  But the provisions are 
not meant as an opportunity for the state to preempt the enforcement 
by the citizens to the detriment of environmental protection and 
public participation. 
As David Hodas has explained, several states have adopted this 
preclusion approach—in practice if not in explicit words—as a way to 
avoid liability.298  Environmental groups such as Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation and Natural Resources Defense Council have been 
victims of collusion between states and polluters.299  The result of the 
preemption has routinely been more lenient sanctions on the polluter 
than the citizen action had demanded.300 
The basis for some of the preemption of citizen suits is to protect 
local industries.301  It has long been believed by some that 
environmental enforcement stymies economic growth, and has been 
the battle-cry of some business groups and lawmakers.  In these lean 
economic times, these arguments have become louder and have 
surfaced in the form of regulatory reform initiatives such as those 
discussed in Part II.  Collusive state preemption of citizen suits will 
only increase as long as lawmakers and policymakers feel that the 
 
 297. We address Congressional intervention to clarify and remove barriers in Part IV, infra. 
 298. See Hodas, supra note 300, 1648–49. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 1650. 
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duty of the state to attract business is mutually exclusive from and in 
overt opposition to the duty to protect environmental health. 
IV. THE CALL TO CONGRESS TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS 
This article has argued that citizen enforcement is the vital third 
leg of the cooperative federalist regime of environmental 
enforcement.  We have also explained why citizen enforcement is 
especially necessary when economic distress affects both public and 
private sectors.  We have also discussed how courts have created 
barriers that impede the full, vigorous citizen enforcement of 
environmental laws that Congress intended—and that has proven 
necessary today. 
In this final section, we propose legislative solutions that will 
maximize the efficacy of supplemental citizen litigation, allowing 
citizen litigants to act as the “citizen attorneys general” that Congress 
envisioned.  These legislative solutions will address the four major 
court-created issues that act as either disincentives or outright 
barriers to citizen litigation.  The solutions we propose take the form 
of legislation—a model act—that will address the major impediments 
to full citizen participation in environmental enforcement. 
A. The “Omnibus Environmental Enforcement Act” 
Congress giveth citizen suits, the courts taketh away, and now it 
is imperative that Congress step in once more to make sure that 
federal citizen suits are able to pick up the slack for the failure of 
cooperative federalism.  The solution to these problems is decisive 
action by the 111th Congress to pass an “Omnibus Environmental 
Enforcement Act” (“the Act”) as a means to facilitate public 
enforcement of environmental laws.  The Act would be codified most 
appropriately as additional provisions of the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA),302 divided into three sections as explained below. 
B. Section One: Congressional Findings 
The Act would initially begin with a list of Congressional findings 
to stand as a backdrop explaining why Congress chose to act in the 
 
 302. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 
(2000), was one of the first laws ever written that establishes the broad national framework for 
protecting our environment, and therefore appropriate for a broad reaching citizen suit 
provision stylized for the same purpose. 
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1970s and why it must act again.  The findings clause would: 1) 
reiterate the Congressional intent of the original environmental 
citizen suits as a means to provide more and better enforcement of 
environmental and human health protections; 2) find that courts have 
misread legislative histories and misinterpreted many citizen suit 
provisions; and 3) state that human and financial resource scarcity in 
federal and state government agencies make it imperative that 
citizens be given full power to step in the shoes of governmental 
regulators to enforce Congress’ important environmental mandates. 
C. Section Two: Essential Framework of Citizen Suits 
The Act would then rescind all current federal environmental 
citizen suits and replace them with one centralized citizen suit 
provision that governs all federal environmental protection laws.  The 
provisions in all acts are all substantially similar.303  The minor 
differences in the processes of citizen enforcement from one 
environmental statute to the next are unnecessary, and only 
contribute to further eroding of citizen enforcement potential.  There 
have been no viable arguments that the process for citizen 
enforcement of CWA, SMCRA, or CAA, or any of the other score of 
environmental laws must be dissimilar from each other or dissimilar 
than the enforcement processes of the federal government.304 
The Act would maintain much of the CAA’s enforcement 
structure, including the notice, delay, and venue provisions of current 
citizen suits.  The Act would also preserve the enforcement rights of 
agency heads.  The Act would permit a citizen to sue a member of the 
regulated community for a violation of a standard or limitation or the 
state or federal government for not enforcing Congressional 
mandates under one of the enumerated statutes.  However, the 
barriers that have intentionally or otherwise been erected by states or 
courts to keep citizen suits out of court must be eliminated. 
D. Section Three: Eliminating Procedural Barriers 
The final section would act as a clarifying provision that would 
address each of the major court-created barriers to citizen litigation 
that we outline in Part III.  The suggestions we propose would allow 
citizen litigants the flexibility to effectively enforce federal 
 
 303. See supra note 7. 
 304. For example, one model citizen suit provision could eliminate the differences in the 
various fee-shifting provisions. See infra Part III.A. 
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environmental laws by providing incentives and reducing barriers to 
their litigation. 
1. Clarifying Attorneys’ Fees Clauses 
First, the provision would provide clear parameters for the 
recovery of attorneys’ fees following a suit.  Congress recognized and 
intended the fee-shifting provisions in the CAA and other 
environmental statutes to act as a statutory exception to the 
American rule.305  Congress can resolve the ambiguity created by 
Ruckelshaus by defining the phrase “whenever appropriate.”306  In 
this definition, the Act would explicitly permit courts to allow 
unsuccessful plaintiffs who “serve the public interest” to receive 
appropriate fees. 
The provision should also explicitly not allow courts to grant 
attorneys’ fees to defendants when a plaintiff, if unsuccessful, brings 
an otherwise colorable claim.  Admittedly, some would counter this 
with the argument that explicit disapproval of fee shifting for the 
defendant would lead to unheeded citizen suits over every state 
action and every environmental permitee, thus deadlocking the courts 
and keeping state officials from actively enforcing environmental 
laws.  However, under Rule 11 sanctions307 and other frivolous law 
suit standards,308 courts still will be able to keep such frivolous suits 
out of the federal judicial system. 
2. Defining “Diligent Prosecution” 
The Act would clarify the ambiguities concerning diligent 
prosecution.  The currently undefined term “diligent”309 would be 
defined temporally by applying six to twelve month transparency 
benchmarks during which the agency must keep the citizen who filed 
the notice informed of its prosecution.  Also, “diligent” would be 
defined qualitatively, by stating that the prosecution shall be one that 
is calculated to lead to compliance and deter future violations.  
 
 305. “[C]ongress meant something more by the provision in the Clean Air Act: it intended 
to encourage the participation of ‘public interest’ groups in resolving complex technical 
questions and important and difficult questions of statutory interpretation, and in monitoring 
the prompt implementation of the Act.”  Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 38. 
 306. See infra Part III. A. 
 307. Federal Rule 11(b) allows for sanctions when a suit or pleading is brought for an 
“improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). 
 308. See supra note 178. 
 309. See discussion at supra note 56. 
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Theoretically, this would require judgment on whether a settled 
sanction between the violator and the government was stringent 
enough for both specific and general deterrence of that violation, thus 
both limiting the need for future governmental or citizen enforcement 
actions. 
The Act would specifically provide for successive citizen suits 
when governmental enforcement has been ineffective or inadequate; 
and it would task the courts to determine the adequacy of 
governmental enforcement based on whether the outcome has or 
would lead to compliance.  Also, it would expressly allow for 
successive citizen suits if the governmental prosecution did not cover 
all allegations of the citizen suit notice.  Finally, this provision would 
address collusive or dilatory preclusion by states by requiring the 
precluding agency or defendant to shoulder the burden of proving 
that the governmental prosecution was diligent and was calculated to 
require compliance. 
3. Reaffirming the Citizen Attorney General Concept 
This section would first address citizen standing by creating a 
new standing paradigm for environmental plaintiffs, one allowing 
them to act as true “citizen attorneys general.”  As we described in 
Part III, standing remains the fundamental barrier to citizen 
enforcement of environmental laws, a barrier that prevents the full 
realization of the citizen attorney concept. 
First, Congress can include language in a new act such as ours to 
reaffirm both its intent and its power to confer a cause of action and 
create a generalized grievance.  This could be accomplished with 
simple language that expands upon the attempted grant of universal 
standing in each of the environmental statutes.  The environmental 
statutes provide that “any person” may sue to enforce the acts, yet the 
Court has not recognized this language as a grant of universal 
standing.310  Congress should unequivocally assert its intention to 
confer a cause of action to all citizens as a way to ensure that their 
environmental laws are complied with. 
An additional device to ensure standing, first proposed by Cass 
Sunstein, would be the inclusion of cash bounties.311  For example, 
Congress could allow successful citizen litigants to obtain modest cash 
prizes, perhaps a few hundred up to a few thousand dollars, in 
addition to litigation expenses.  Citizens would then have a direct 
 
 310. CAA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006). 
 311. Sunstein, supra note 183, at 232. 
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interest and a concrete stake in the outcome of the litigation: win and 
they make money. 
At the very least, our suggestions would force the Supreme 
Court to focus squarely on Congress’ constitutional power to confer 
such a cause of action to citizens.  The novel language we suggest 
would no doubt be challenged and would almost certainly reach the 
Court.  But such a challenge would provide an opportunity for the 
Court to move beyond the narrow analysis of the sufficiency of 
injuries in fact.  The Court could move instead to the more 
fundamental question of whether Congress has the power to convey 
universal standing to citizen plaintiffs. 
4. Eleventh Amendment 
Finally, the Act would affirm that state regulations pursuant to 
federal laws shall remain federal laws.  This clarification would ensure 
that the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize state officials from 
citizen suits.  As stated previously, it is imperative that citizens be 
allowed to stand in the shoes of the federal government when 
enforcing environmental mandates in suits against both private 
individuals and the government itself.  Just as the federal government 
can take action against a state to require adherence to federal 
mandates, so shall citizens. 
In fact, the proposed provision should implicitly reference the Ex 
parte Young doctrine as the basis for citizen enforcement of federal 
standards against state officials as an exception to sovereign 
immunity.312  The proposed provision would maintain the language in 
current citizen suits that a citizen may bring suit against governmental 
instrumentality or agency “to the extent permitted by the Eleventh 
Amendment.”313  However, it would clarify the phrase “to the extent 
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution” by 
permitting citizens of a state to file suit against its state or state 
agency or official for not enforcing; conforming its regulations to; or 
otherwise abiding to the federal minimum standards or limitations of 
the enumerated environmental laws covered by the Act. 
 
 312. The provision may state that “a federal court can issue prospective injunctive and 
declaratory relief compelling a state official to comply with federal law.”  See S&M Brands v. 
Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 313. “[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf against . . . any 
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment.”  
See CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
The idea for this article was borne from our simple belief that 
environmental laws should be vigorously enforced to be effective.  By 
including citizen suit provisions in nearly every environmental statute 
enacted since the 1970s, Congress has demonstrated that it, too, 
shares our belief.  These provisions act as an insurance policy, as a 
way to ensure that environmental laws can be enforced even when 
state and federal governments fail to do so.  Indeed, the legislative 
histories behind these acts show that Congress did not want an 
ineffective, or broken, enforcement model to impede natural resource 
protection. 
As we have explained, the cooperative federalist enforcement 
model has proven ineffective on many levels, resulting in unenforced 
laws.  Each flaw in this model, moreover, is created by or 
compounded by political resistance to regulation and tightening state 
agency budgets.  Citizen enforcement, therefore, is increasingly 
necessary.  It is true that “the citizen suit is meant to supplement 
rather than to supplant governmental action.”314  But the citizen suit 
should not itself be supplanted by procedural obstacles.  The four 
major legal barriers we have described that hamper citizen access to 
the courts are significant but not insurmountable.  The effect of these 
barriers is to alter Congress’s grant of citizen standing, preventing 
public interest groups like ours from enforcing national standards.  
But relatively simple legislative changes, such as the ones we have 
described, will allow Congress to reassert its intention and power to 
convey citizens’ broad enforcement powers. 
 
 
 314. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). 
